Three essays on institutions, financial markets and foreign direct investment by Le, Tuan Viet
Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports 
2012 
Three essays on institutions, financial markets and foreign direct 
investment 
Tuan Viet Le 
West Virginia University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Le, Tuan Viet, "Three essays on institutions, financial markets and foreign direct investment" (2012). 
Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports. 569. 
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/569 
This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research 
Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that is 
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain 
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license 
in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses, 
Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU. 
For more information, please contact researchrepository@mail.wvu.edu. 
THREE ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONS, FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
 
 
Tuan Viet Le 
 
 
Dissertation submitted to the 
College of Business and Economics at 
West Virginia University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 





Stratford Douglas, Ph.D., Chair 
Santiago Pinto, Ph.D. 
Paul Speaker, Ph.D. 
William N. Trumbull, Ph.D. 
Dongwoo Yoo, Ph.D. 
 
Department of Economics 




Keywords: Institutions, press freedom, asset returns, CAPM, corruption,  
foreign direct investment, development 
 
Copyright 2012 Tuan V. Le 
ABSTRACT 
 
Three Essays on Institutions, Financial Markets and Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Tuan V. Le 
 
This dissertation is composed of three essays in financial economics and development 
economics.  The underlying theme in three essays is about the impact of institution quality on 
financial markets and foreign direct investment (FDI).  There are five chapters included in this 
dissertation.  Chapter one is the introduction.  Chapter two of my dissertation investigates the 
connection between freedom of the press and equity returns in emerging market firms.  Freedom 
of the press is argued to affect systematic risk in financial markets and thus, has impact on 
returns of financial assets.  The study reveals that there is significant connection between 
freedom of the press and equity returns.  My two other chapters study a different angle of 
institutional quality: corruption.  Chapter three examines the relationship between corruption 
heterogeneity between two countries and bilateral FDI between the two.  The results suggest that 
foreign investors tend to choose an economy with similar corruption level to invest.  In chapter 
four, analysis is carried further to investigate the effect of FDI from a corrupt country on host 
country corruption level.  The empirical results indicate that FDI from a corrupt country will 
increase the corruption level in host country.  Finally, chapter 5 summarizes the major findings 
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Most economists believe that sound institutions are essential for development and growth.  
Countries with better institutions usually have more secure property rights and less distorted 
policies.  Those countries will invest more in physical and human capital and will use these more 
efficiently to achieve a higher level of income (North and Thomas 1973, North 1981).  
According to Douglass North (1991), “Institutions are humanly devised constraints that shape 
human action.”  There is immense research on the impact of institutions on economic growth.  
Knack, Stephen and Keefer (1995), Acemoglu et al (2001, 2002) have investigated the 
importance of good institutions in protecting property rights and boosting investment in an 
economy.  Beck and Levine (2003) find that extractive colonizers tend to create extractive 
institutions which do not protect private property rights or support long term economic growth.  
On the other hand, settler colonizers tend to design producer-friendly institutions which, in turn, 
support private property rights.  In those countries where sounds institutions are created, the 
economy and financial markets experience progress in development.  Several other studies also 
find a strong relationship between property rights and investment or output (Besley, 1995).  Li 
(2002) demonstrates that developed countries with greater economic freedom and stronger 
shareholder protections have larger total equity market capitalizations as a percentage of GDP.  
Another trend of research focuses on the connection between institutions and financial 
markets.  Some research has shown that the observed size of a country’s equity market is 
associated with institutions similar to those measured by the Fraser Institute’s Economic 
Freedom of the World (EFW) index.  La Porta et al. (1997) finds that the legal environment 
affects the size of a country’s capital markets (size is measured by total market capitalization as a 
percentage of GDP.  The reason for this finding is simple: Countries with strong legal protections 
for investors have larger and broader capital markets.  Huang (2005) posits that the improvement 
of institutional quality has an impact on financial development, especially for low income 
countries with high ethnic diversity.  Olson (1993), Minier (1998), and Person (2005) conclude 
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that democracy enhances civil liberty, improves economic freedom, fosters the efficient 
allocation of resources, and dampens corruption.  Furthermore, democracy strengthens contract 
enforcement and property rights protection which, in turn, can affect financial market 
development.  Democracy also imposes sufficient checks and balances on government 
accountability to ensure that there is commitment and less danger of opportunism.  However, 
democracy is also claimed to be harmful for development.  The reason for this finding is that 
democracy is not efficient in decision making under pressure from different interest groups.  On 
the other hand, interest groups such as labor unions, which focus on wages and consumer 
demands, can be managed better by an autocratic regime.  
 Media are considered as a crucial institution in financial markets.  However, there is not a 
great deal of research on the relationship between the media and financial markets.  Djankov et 
al (2003) found that state control of the media is linked to poverty, high corruption and less 
developed financial markets.  On the other hand, Besley and Burgess (2002) consider the case of 
India and postulate that a strong democracy with a relatively free media can increase government 
responsiveness.  In another paper, Coyne and Leeson (2008) investigate the cases of Romania 
where different privately owned media agents were under the influence of state infrastructure 
and distribution networks and hence generated biased information.  Roy (2010) studies the effect 
of foreign direct investment on media and finds that higher flow of foreign direct investment 
enhances media freedom.  Roy (2010) also concludes that press freedom has a negative impact 
on terrorism.  The second chapter of this dissertation aims to bridge the gap by empirically 
testing the relationship between media freedom and financial assets returns in 16 emerging 
economies.  
My two other chapters study a different angle of institutional quality: corruption.  The 
third chapter of this dissertation investigates the relationship between corruption heterogeneity 
between two countries and bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) between the two.  
Understanding the effect of corruption on FDI is crucial since corruption might create 
uncertainty in economic policy as well as unethical competition in business and increase cost of 
doing business.  By doing so, corruption might also bring unreasonable advantages to some firms 
and distort the markets.  That will likely push the economy out of a Pareto optimal state.     
Cross-border flows of direct investment have grown remarkably in the past twenty years.  
According to Held et al. (1999), total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has grown at a faster 
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speed than the income of the world since 1960s, and multinational corporations (MNCs) 
contribute more than 70 percent to world trade.  Although MNCs are the most significant sources 
of FDI, an individual, a firm or a government can also participate in this investment process.  
Due to decreasing restrictions on global capital movement, FDI has increasingly become 
important.  Lipsey (2001) shows that FDI inflow in many countries recover in shorter period of 
time than portfolio and debt flows during financial crises.  FDI has become a more favorable 
capital source for developing countries due to that characteristic.  
FDI contributes to growth in host countries in a several ways.  It allows the transfer of 
new technology, management skills, etc. that cannot be achieved by trade in goods and services 
or financial investment.  Much empirical research shows a larger impact on productivity and 
income growth by FDI than by domestic investment.  The reason is that FDI firms enhance the 
quality and volume of goods produced due to advanced technology (Lipsey and Sjholm, 2004).  
Bosworth et al. (1999) argues that FDI has positive effects on domestic economy of 58 
developing countries during 1978-1995.  In that study, Bosworth investigates the impact of three 
different types of investment inflows: FDI, portfolio investment, and other financial flows 
(mainly bank loans).  He was able to show that impact of FDI on domestic investment almost 
double that of capital flows.  The study also indicates that FDI is beneficial enough to offset the 
evident risk of free capital movement across borders for developing countries.  FDI will also 
create a spillover effect in technology across countries through the channels of imitation, 
franchise, training or competition (Lensink and Morrissey 2001).  Lensink and Morrissey (2001) 
also argue that the existence of an educated labor force in host countries and a developed 
domestic financial system have positive impacts on economic growth.   
There is a rich literature on the determinants of FDI decisions.  A large body of literature 
studies the partial equilibrium and suggests that a MNE’s FDI decisions depend on some factors 
such as cheap labor, local markets, taxes, trade protection and regulation (Froot and Stein 1991).  
The quality of institutions is also an important determinant of FDI.  Poor private property 
protection increases the chance of expropriation and diminishes FDI inflow.  Poor quality of 
institutions also increases the cost of investment and, thus, discourages FDI activity (See 
Hartman 1984, 1985).  Last but not least, poor institution usually leads to poor infrastructure and 
results in low profitability for foreign investors.  
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Corruption is one indicator for institutional quality in a country. There is empirical 
evidence showing the negative impacts of corruption on domestic investment and economic 
growth.  However, the evidence of corruption on FDI is still ambiguous. The general view is that 
corruption is detrimental to an economy (Shleifer and Vishny 1993).  Corruption also has the 
potential to discourage FDI inflows (Mauro 1995).  Wei (1998) shows that there exists a negative 
relationship between corruption levels in host countries and FDI inflow.  However, it is far from 
the point where a complete agreement about role of corruption on FDI is reached.  Wheeler and 
Mody (1992), on the other hand, finds no significant impact of corruption on FDI.  Hines (1995) 
also fails to find that type of connection.  Soreide (2004, 2006) shows that foreign investors and 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) are not always deterred by corruption and appear to be very 
adjustable to local business environment and even engage in corruption.  Indeed, Larrain and 
Tavares (2004) find that FDI might be a vehicle fighting corruption.  This paradox requires more 
careful and specific study on the impact of corruption on FDI.  
The second chapter of this dissertation explores the relationship between media 
independence and equity returns in an extended CAPM framework.  I address the specific 
question “Do independent media have any direct or indirect impact on asset return in an 
economy?”  Effective and unbiased media can promote economic progress.  In addition, media 
can act as a handcuff on a leviathan government by generating an informed and aware populace.  
Thus, the media have a unique potential to provide a check on government and business 
accountability and enable the public to make more informed decisions (See Djankov et al. 2003, 
Coyne and Leeson 2005, 2008).  As a result, more free media will help to reduce risks facing by 
investors.  
In the literature, there is some research on risks and returns in emerging markets.  Levich 
(2001) argues that emerging markets might offer higher equity returns and are weakly correlated 
with mature markets.  Levich (2001) also indicates that most investor portfolios reflect a home 
country bias in equities as well as bonds.  Factors such as transaction costs and taxes have been 
used to justify this bias.  Also according to Levich (2001), investing overseas involves great 
exchange risk and possible information disadvantages.  While many researchers have found that 
asymmetric information is one reason for high volatility and one type of risk in financial 
markets, the role of media in reducing that risk has not yet been studied thoroughly (See Solnik 
2000).  This paper attempts to bridge that gap and investigate how a free and unbiased press 
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affects excess returns in stock markets.  Freedom of the press is used as a proxy for freedom of 
media. This study hypothesizes that systematic risk, and therefore excess returns, are higher in 
countries with less press freedom.  Using the International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) 
and Fama-MacBeth’s methodology and dataset for 16 emerging countries from 1986 to 2000, 
this research is able to show that expected returns are significantly related to the degree of press 
freedom.  
The third chapter of my dissertation analyzes the relationship between bilateral foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and corruption level between source and recipient country.  I address the 
specific question “Does FDI tend to flow more between two countries with similar corruption 
levels?”  The conventional view is that corruption has negative impact on an economy (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1993).  Corruption also has the potential to discourage FDI inflows (Mauro 1995).  
The literature on the determinants of multinational enterprises’ (MNE) decisions and FDI 
location is quite substantial.  A large body of literature studies the partial equilibrium and 
predicts that a MNE’s FDI decisions depend on exogenous factors such as taxes, trade protection 
and exchange rates (See Foot and Stein 1991, Grubert and Mutti 1991).  The quality of 
institutions is also an important determinant of FDI.  Poor legal protection of assets increases the 
chance of expropriation and diminishes FDI inflow.  Poor quality of institutions or corruption 
also increases the cost of doing business and, thus, discourages FDI activity (See Hartman 1984, 
1985).  Last but not least, poor institution or corruption usually leads to poor infrastructure and 
results in low profitability for foreign investors.  Indeed, Wei (1993) finds a negative correlation 
between corruption levels in host countries and inward FDI.  
When facing a high cost of bribe and corruption in a host country, foreign investors can 
opt to invest or stay out.  Foreign investors, in fact, appear to be very flexible in adjusting their 
activities to the local political environment and practices, while others even actively engage in 
corruption.  While most previous research ignores the heterogeneity of investors, this paper 
argues that investors are heterogeneous in adjusting ability.  The adjusting ability might be 
determined by numerous factors including language, culture, experience, financial position, 
market power.  In fact, investors from corrupt countries might learn from their experience and 
adapt at a faster rate in another corrupt country.  As a result, they may be more successful in 
bribing local officers and surviving in new environment.  Using a panel of 189 countries over the 
1995-2008 period, the paper empirically tests the hypothesis that FDI inflow is negatively 
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correlated with corruption, yet positively correlated with homogeneity in corruption levels 
between two countries.  The results support my hypothesis after taking into account effects of 
other control variables. 
Chapter four of the dissertation extends the research on FDI and effect of FDI on 
corruption.  I address the specific question “Does the FDI from corrupt countries increase the 
level of corruption in host countries?”  While previous research focuses on negative impact of 
corruption on FDI inflow; yet inbound FDI may have impact on corruption levels in the host 
countries.  The paper argues that the impact of FDI on corruption levels in the host countries is 
conditional on the investors’ underlying economic and political climate.  Most previous studies 
assume that investors are homogeneous and react in a similar manner to conditions of host 
countries.  This paper, on the other hand, assumes that investors are heterogeneous and react 
differently.  A foreign investor might bring in capital, entrepreneurship, and management skills 
to take advantage of abundant resources in host countries.   Another investor, on the other hand, 
might bribe local officials in order to exploit the local resources and thus, increase the corruption 
levels in host countries. Using a panel of 189 countries over the period 1995-2008, this paper 
tests the hypothesis that FDI from corrupt countries will magnify the corruption levels in host 
countries.  The results provide evidence that there is significant relationship between corruption 
and FDI from corrupt countries.  However, it takes time for foreign investors to influence local 
corruption levels. In addition, the relationship might be nonlinear.  
Findings in my study also suggest a loop of FDI and corruption that exist in developing 
countries with poor institutions.  The loop is that corrupt countries might receive more direct 
investment from foreign firms in similarly corrupt conditions.  Foreign firms from corrupt 
countries, in turn, have potential to worsen underlying poor institutions in host countries by 
bribing local officials.  As a result, local government officials in developing countries might have 
incentives to be associated with more bribery and less intention for any ameliorative actions.    
Worse corruption level might turn away potential clean firms and increase the number of firms 
from corrupt countries.  The increase in number of firms from corrupt background might, again, 
aggravate corruption in host countries.  The process may keep going on and on. 
 
The overall theme and focus of this dissertation is the impact of institution quality on 
financial markets and economic condition.  Contributions to existing literature include the 
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empirical findings about the importance of press freedom in stock markets, the impact of 
corruption on foreign direct investment, and the influences of firms from corrupt countries on 
host countries’ economic conditions.  Chapter five of my dissertation summarizes the 




 Freedom of the Press and Equity Returns: Empirical 








This paper explores the relationship between media independence and equity returns in an 
extended Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) framework.  In this study, media are considered 
as a crucial institution in the financial market.  I address the specific question “Do independent 
media have any direct or indirect impact on asset returns in an economy?”  Since the CAPM is a 
popular model dealing with the risk-return relationship of financial assets it is used as a 
benchmark model for answering this question.  In the CAPM framework, investors need to be 
compensated for the risks they take.  There are two types of risks in financial markets: systematic 
risk and unsystematic risk.  In the CAPM, investors diversify their investments to reduce 
unsystematic risk.  If their portfolios are well-diversified, investors only bear systematic risk.  
Hence, expected returns depend only on systematic risk.  On the other hand, systematic risk will 
be affected by many other factors over which institutions may have some influence.  Sound 
institutions help to secure property rights which, in turn, are crucial for all investors. Moreover, 
good institutions including a free press may produce more stable and predictable economic 
policies.  These will, in turn, affect the investment patterns of firms who will tend to invest more 
in an economy with better institutions. 
Using the CAPM framework, I incorporate press freedom as an indicator of institutional 
quality to capture the effect of media on systematic risk and hence expected returns in emerging 
financial markets.  My hypothesis is that media play a vital institutional role in affecting stock 
returns on assets.  Due to better quality information provided to investors, a crucial function for 
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checking government and business accountability, free media will have a positive effect on the 
economy.  Investors might become more optimistic about better business climate.  They might 
invest more in financial markets and boost the economy.  That is likely to increase prices for 
financial assets and produce higher excess returns for investors.  As a result, free media are 
argued to have positive relationship with excess returns.  
However, one might argue that free media may improve the business climate and reduce 
the systematic risk faced by investors in the economy.  They therefore will require lower 
expected excess returns on financial assets for the lower risk they face.  On the other hand, local 
and foreign investors will get access to more reliable information about firms and the whole 
economy.  Consequently, financial markets will become more efficient; the economy will 
become more competitive.  Investors will find it harder to beat the market.  In addition, investors 
in competitive markets are likely to take business opportunities quickly.  Competition therefore 
will lower the rate of return of capital.  As a result, the expected excess returns might be lower in 
a free media economy than in a less free one.  Accordingly, free media has a negative 
relationship with excess returns.  This argument seems to contradict the previous one.  
This study tries to find the answer for the issue mentioned above.  My findings indicate 
that media freedom in a country may make a difference.  More media freedom may lead to less 
compensation required by investors.   The empirical results suggest that a one point increase in 
initial press freedom in each country may lower the expected annual excess return by 0.266 
percent.  The coefficient is significant at the 10% level.  As media freedom increases, some 
systematic risk in the market can be reduced.  Those types of risks, in turn, will reduce the 
expected returns and attract more capital flows into financial markets.  More capital flows into 
financial markets provide more opportunities for economic growth.  Media freedom, therefore, 
indirectly increase the comparative advantage of an economy in terms of financial capital.  This 
is especially important for developing countries since they need capital for growth and to 
overcome the poverty trap.   
Without reliable information, it is not possible for investors to gather relevant trustworthy 
information about firms and macroeconomic policies, nor would they see some problems and 
issues that they face in managing risks in their investments.  Since the media provide a major 
source of information and an essential link between government and market, their independence 
is a crucial precondition for both government and social accountability.  Daily news flow creates 
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headlines of political events, government macroeconomic policies and actions of political 
officials, and provides a basis on which investors make many choices.  The media also create a 
forum where a broad range of voices – opposition parties, civil society activists, independent 
experts and ordinary citizens – can express alternative views. Hence, the media are widely seen 
as a “Fourth Estate.”  This term establishes the media as an institution alongside other branches 
of government who work together to provide a system of checks and balances to control political 
officials and forestall misuses of power.  As a result, government may be more cautious and 
consistent with its macroeconomic policy.  This consistency, in return, may reduce systematic 
risk in financial markets.  For instance, if government is consistent with its exchange rate 
policies in the short term, then long term investors will incorporate the information about 
exchange rate policies in asset prices.  Investors might also rely on government policies to assess 
and hedge against exchange rate risks.  Hedging will reduce risk for investors and for the market.    
Analyzing press freedom measured by the widely-used Freedom House Index from 1994 
to 2000 also motivates this study.  This index is based on the answers to 23 survey questions 
divided into three categories: economic environment, political environment and legal 
environment.  All three categories reflect media activities in each country.  The economic 
environment expresses the structure and concentration of media, transparency, and impact of 
state control, corruption and economic institutions on media.  The political environment category 
judges the political control over media’s content.  The degree of control over media freedom by 
local laws and the ability of journalists to operate freely without government regulations are 
expressed in the legal environment category.  The degree to which each country permits the free 
flow of information identifies the classification of its media as “Free”, “Partly Free” or “Not 
Free.”  The media freedom score in a country is given a total score from 0 to 100 points. 0 is 
assigned to be the most free and 100 is assigned to be the least free by Freedom House.  
Countries scoring 0 to 30 are regarded as having “Free” media; 31 to 60, “Partly Free” media; 
and 61 to 100, “Not Free” media.  For the convenience of this study, the scores have been 
rescaled so that higher scores indicate greater press freedom.  
Press freedom scores of developing countries in this period fluctuate markedly whereas 
those from developed countries do not (See Figure 2.1 and 2.2).  This might help explain why 
financial markets in developed countries are more efficient than ones in developing countries.  
Among developing countries in the sample, Nigeria has the most unstable press freedom.  I 
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therefore choose Nigeria for a case study on the relationship between press freedom and stock 
returns.  Nigeria gained independence from the United Kingdom on October 1, 1960.  The 
economy of the country at that time was heavily dependent on oil exports.  During the military 
era from 1979 to 1992, Nigeria was governed by military leaders such as Muhammadu Buhari 
and Ibrahim Babangida.  Those leaders gained power through coups and became dictators shortly 
after that.  Their governments are corrupt and responsible for creating the corruption culture in 
Nigeria.  On June 12 1993, fair and free elections finally took place in the country and a 
promising civilian regime was established.  As a result, Nigeria enjoyed a partly free media at the 
beginning of 1994.  However, the civilian regime did not last long.  General Sani Abacha took 
over the country through a military coup in late 1993.  Nigeria, again, was deep in military 
suppression with high corruption.  Media freedom scores also experienced a sharp drop in 1995 
and 1996.  The regime came to an end when Sani Abacha died in 1998 and his death brought a 
great chance for a civilian government.  The first civilian president Olusegun Obasanjo came to 
office in 1999.  Although there was suspicion about the fairness of the elections in 1999 and 
2003, civilian governments in Nigeria have made progress in attacking corruption, freeing people 
and developing the economy (Fagbadebo 2007).  Media enjoyed increased freedom as well.  
Media freedom scores jumped remarkably from 7 in 1998 to 45 in 1999 and remained relatively 
high after that.  
Using data for press freedom from Freedom House Index and stocks prices from EMDB 
2000, figure 3.3 illustrates the connection between press freedom and excess stock returns in 
Nigeria from 1994 to 2000.  Returns are average annual returns for all firms in the sample.  As 
figure 3 shows, there is a negative relationship between independence of media and excess stock 
returns.  This observation also motivates my study.   
Section II of this paper contains a review of relevant literature.  Section III describes data 
used in the paper.  Section IV describes empirical models and the main results while section V 
presents robustness checks with conclusions described in section VI.   
 
2. Literature Review 
Most economists agree that institutions play a crucial role in the growth process of a nation.  The 
literature shows that institutions are significant determinants of financial markets in an economy.  
Beck and Levine (2003) found that extractive colonizers tend to create extractive institutions 
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which do not protect private property rights or support long term economic growth.  On the other 
hand, settler colonizers tend to design producer-friendly institutions which, in turn, support 
private property rights.  In those countries where sound institutions are created, the economy and 
financial markets experience progress in development.  
Countries with better institutions usually have more secure property rights and less 
distorting policies.  Those countries will invest more in physical and human capital and will use 
these more efficiently to achieve a higher level of income (North and Thomas 1973, North 
1981).  According to North (1991), “Institutions are humanly devised constraints that shape 
human action.”  The literature has also examined the importance of institutions for financial 
development.  Recent research has focused on the relationship between economic freedom and 
the size of a country’s equity market, measured by total market capitalization as a percentage of 
gross domestic products (GDP).  Knack, Stephen and Keefer (1995), Acemoglu et al (2001, 
2002) have investigated the importance of good institutions in protecting property rights and 
boosting investment in an economy.  Several other studies also find a strong relationship 
between property rights and investment or output (Besley, 1995). Li (2002) demonstrates that 
developed countries with greater economic freedom and stronger shareholder protections have 
larger total equity market capitalizations as a percentage of GDP.  In particular, the size of their 
equity markets is negatively correlated to the size of government, as measured by government 
consumption as a percentage of GDP.  For developing countries, Li indicates that openness to 
trade is conducive to the growth of the equity market.  
Other research has shown that the observed size of a country’s equity market is 
associated with institutions similar to those measured by the Fraser Institute’s Economic 
Freedom of the World (EFW) index.  La Porta et al. (1997) finds that the legal environment 
affects the size and extent of a country’s capital markets (size is measured by total market 
capitalization as a percentage of GDP; extent is measured by the number of listed companies and 
initial public offerings per capita).  The reason for this finding is simple: Countries with strong 
legal protections for investors have larger and broader capital markets.  
Another research trend has focused on the effect of democracy and political liberalization 
on financial markets.  Huang (2005) posits that the improvement of institutional quality has an 
impact on financial development, especially for low income countries with high ethnic diversity.  
However, some studies argued that democracy is both a facilitator and an impediment of growth.  
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Olson (1993), Minier (1998), and Person (2005) conclude that democracy enhances civil liberty, 
improves economic freedom, fosters the efficient allocation of resources, and dampens 
corruption.  Furthermore, democracy strengthens contract enforcement and property rights 
protection which, in turn, can affect financial market development.  Democracy also imposes 
sufficient checks and balances on government accountability to ensure that there is commitment 
and less danger of opportunism.  However, democracy might be harmful for development.  The 
reason for this finding is that democracy is not efficient in decision making under pressure from 
different interest groups.  On the other hand, interest groups such as labor unions, which focus on 
wages and consumer demands, can be managed better by an autocratic regime.  
 Levine and Zervos (1998) conclude that total stock market capitalization becomes a 
larger percentage of GDP following capital control liberalization.  Perotti and Van Oijen (2001) 
achieve similar findings for privatization in emerging economies by demonstrating that the 
privatization process reduces political risk, which in turn causes excess stock market returns in 
emerging economies.  In another study, which is narrowly focused on the idiosyncratic events of 
equity market liberalization, Henry (2000) relies on the international capital asset pricing model 
(ICAPM) and concluded, “The standard ICAPM makes a salient prediction about an emerging 
country that does not allow foreigners to purchase shares in its stock market: the country’s 
aggregate cost of equity capital (i.e., the discount rate) will fall when it opens its stock market to 
foreign investors . . . and we should see an increase in an emerging country’s equity price index 
when the market learns of an impending future stock market liberalization.”  
There is not a great deal of research on the relationship between the media and financial 
markets.  Djankov et al (2003) found that state control of the media is linked to poverty, high 
corruption and less developed financial markets.  Coyne and Leeson (2005) indicate that 
politicians can use their power to manipulate media in favor of their self-interest at the expense 
of society.  On the other hand, Besley and Burgess (2002) consider the case of India and 
postulate that a strong democracy with a relatively free media can increase government 
responsiveness.  In another paper, Coyne and Leeson (2008) investigate the cases of Romania 
where different privately owned media agents were under the influence of state infrastructure 
and distribution networks and hence generate biased information.  Roy (2010) studies the effect 
of foreign direct investment on media and finds that higher flow of foreign direct investment 
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enhances media freedom.  Roy (2010) also concludes that press freedom has a negative impact 
on terrorism.  
There is additional previous literature on stock markets in emerging countries. Perotti and 
VanOijen (1999) demonstate that privatization may benefit stock market development by 
reducing political risk.  Suret (1998) looks at the profitable periods for 20 emerging economies 
from 1976 to 1994.  Solnik (2000) indicates that emerging market equities generally have higher 
average returns, lower correlations with developed markets, greater serial correlation, and greater 
volatility.  Funke (2002) finds that the stock market in emerging markets is significantly affected 
by private consumer spending.  Levich (2001) argues that emerging markets might offer higher 
equity returns and are weakly correlated with mature markets.  Levich (2001) also indicates that 
most investor portfolios reflect a home country bias in equities as well as bonds.  Factors such as 
transaction costs and taxes have been used to justify this bias.   Also according to Levich (2001), 
investing overseas involves great exchange risk and possible information disadvantages.  Solnik 
(2000) argues that additional cultural differences could be a major impediment to foreign 
investment, investors often feel unfamiliar with foreign cultures and markets.  Solnik (2000) also 
states that the different trading procedures, report presentations, languages, and time zones all 
contribute to a perception of risk due to greater unfamiliarity.   
Though some political and institutional influences on stock markets have been discussed 
in the literature, not many empirical results regarding the relationship between media freedom 
and stock returns have been demonstrated.   This paper bridges that gap by using the CAPM 
framework and data in 16 emerging countries.  The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is 
widely used to value asset returns in the context of risk and expected return.  The basic idea of 
the CAPM is that investors need to be compensated by additional return when taking on 
additional risk.  The riskier the investment, the more expected return is required.  There are two 
types of risk that investors may face: systematic risk and unsystematic risk. In the CAPM 
framework, unsystematic risk will be reduced to zero if investors hold well-diversified portfolios, 
so unsystematic risk will not be compensated.  Systematic risk, on the other hand, cannot be 
diversified and so investors will be compensated for undertaking it.  In the CAPM, the risk of 







Several sources for data are used in this paper.  Data in this paper include: (i) closing price 
indices for emerging markets; (ii) World index; (iii) Risk free rate; (iv) Press freedom; (v) other 
control variables.  
The closing price and the local currency indices for emerging countries come from the 
Emerging Market Database (EMDB) 2000 which is issued by the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC).  The database includes approximately 800 firms across nine industries.  It 
includes market performance, market capitalization, monthly value traded, local stock market 
price indexes, and prices in local currencies.  These indexes are calculated for prices and returns.  
Depending on the country, annual coverage starts as early as 1975, while monthly coverage starts 
in 1986.  In order to get returns of firms in US dollars, local returns are multiplied by exchange 
rates after being calculated for local market returns.  For world indices, data are taken from 
Morgan Stanley International Database (MSCI). The data on US one-month Treasury bill rates 
come from Fama - French website.   All data are obtained monthly.  In my dataset, there are 672 
firms across nine industries in 16 countries from 1986 to 2000.  That also means there are on 
average 42 firms for each country in the dataset.  The exact number of firms range from 24 to 52.   
Another data set for control variables is obtained from the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG), which includes data about political, economic and financial risks in each country.  
International Country Risk Guide is one of the most popular sources of country risk analysis and 
ratings.  ICRG monitors 140 countries and updates monthly.  ICRG assigns values to the 22 
indicators underlying ICRG business-oriented model for quantifying risk, examining such 
country-specific elements as currency risk, political leadership, the military and religion in 
politics, and corruption.  Risk level in a country is scaled so that a higher number translates to 
lower risk.  Since this paper aims to measure the risk – return relation in financial markets, these 
risks can be partly captured in ICRG.   These variables, therefore, can be used as control 
variables and for robustness checks.  
In the ICRG data set, internal and external conflict indexes measure the political stability 
and the possibilities of involving in any conflicts in a specific country.  The index ranges from 1 
(most likely to have conflicts) to 12 (least likely).  The corruption perception index captures how 
extent corruption is pervasive in a country.  It scales from 1 (most corrupt) to 6 (least corrupt).     
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 My dataset consist of a sample of 16 countries
1
 with 672 firms in total from 1986 to 
2000.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
This paper studies the connection between media independence and stock returns in emerging 
countries using the CAPM framework.  There is a vast literature of empirical work on CAPM.  
Researchers use different methodology and models to test their hypothesis.  Among those, Fama-
MacBeth (1973) introduced a two-pass regression methodology to empirically test hypothetical 
models.  The method has become standard in empirical work in this field.  I therefore use the 
method for my study.  The crucial assumptions under this method are that the asset pricing 
model is correctly specified and the factors are correctly identified.  This methodology also 
assumes that market betas account for a significant portion of the cross-sectional variability in 
stock returns.  
4.1 Ordinary Least Square Model 
 Time series estimates of the asset beta and gammas are obtained in the first pass by 
ordinary least square (OLS).  The beta and gammas in the first pass regression are assumed to be 
fixed and capture most of the systematic risk in financial markets.  In the second pass, estimated 
beta and gammas from first pass will be used as explanatory variables for excess returns of 
stocks since those betas might capture major risk-return relationships.  I also incorporate other 
explanatory variables in the second pass to test the hypothesis.  The dependent variable in the 
first pass is the monthly excess return of a stock portfolio over the risk free rate for each country.  
I use equally-weighted portfolios based on the firms in each country to reduce the idiosyncratic 
risk through portfolio diversification.  Since data used in first pass regression are monthly there 
are maximum of 2,880 (12 months x 15 years x 16 countries) observations for dependent 
variables.  The specification for the regression in the first pass is as follows: 
 rit – rft = αit + βi 
W
 (rWt – rft) + γi (rext – rft) + εit          (1) 
The first pass is run for every country individually and each country has invariant 
estimated beta and gammas.  rit is the monthly return of equally-weighted portfolio for country 
                                                 
1
 See table 7 for list of countries in data set.  
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i at time t.  rW is the return on the World indices, rf is the risk – free rate of US one – month 
treasury bill, rex is a vector of return on exchange rates.  In this study, I assume that foreign 
investors use the following strong currencies for majority of trading: U.S. Dollar; German Mark; 
Japanese Yen and British Pound.  The dataset is available from 1986 to 2000, so the Euro is not 
included.  Return on exchange rate is calculated using four active mentioned currencies.  
The second pass regression uses the estimated betas and gammas from the first pass as 
independent regressors.  This step estimates the effect of freedom of the press on excess returns 
on each market.  The second pass regression is as follows:  
rit – rft =a +b βi 
W
+ c γi +d ∆ (Press freedom)it+ e Initial(Press freedom)it+ f  Xit + ηit  (2)  
where rit is the annual return of equally-weighted portfolio for country i at time t.  rft is the risk – 
free rate of US one–year treasury bill.   βi
W
 is the estimated beta of world excess return for 
country i. γi is the estimated gamma for exchange rate return for country i.  Xit is a vector of 
control variables.  I construct initial press freedom variable to capture the status of press freedom 
in a country in the past.  This variable reflects the well-established condition and changes of the 
press in reasonable years.  Therefore, it is more informative, less volatile and describes the trend 
in press freedom better than a single year’s observation.  Specifically, initial press freedom is the 
average of all previous press freedom scores at time t.  For instance, initial press freedom of 
Russia in 1990 is the average of all press freedom scores for Russia from 1986 to 1989.  Initial 
press freedom also indicates the average level of systematic risk in each country.  Higher initial 
press freedom reflects a lower level of systematic risk.  My hypothesis predicts that initial press 
freedom is negatively correlated with excess returns of financial assets.  ∆(Press freedom) refers 
to the change in press freedom in one year for each country.  ∆(Press freedom)t is the difference 
between press freedom at time t and initial press freedom at time t.  Positive  ∆(Press freedom) 
refers to an increase in press freedom.  This change might be considered as a positive shock to 
investors.  Investors might become more optimistic about short-run prospect.  That will translate 
to higher prices for financial assets and higher excess returns.  Therefore, I predict that ∆(Press 
freedom) is positively correlated with excess returns of financial assets.  
Although the media constitute one institution that may be important to economic 
development, there are other types of institutional indicators that can also affect economic 
development of a country, systematic risk, and that correlate with freedom of the press.  These 
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factors might create additional systematic risk and may also be barrier to international 
investment. Therefore, they should be controlled for to estimate the importance of press freedom 
in stock markets.  This paper uses the dataset from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
for control variables.  Among these variables, corruption, internal conflicts, and external 
conflicts might be expected to have considerable effects on systematic risk in firm business 
environments, and therefore should be related to expected return on equity.  Thus, it seems 
reasonable to control for the impact of corruption, internal and external conflicts.  
Table 2.1 summarizes all sources of data used in this study.  Table 2.2 presents some 
descriptive statistics for the main variables.  Table 2.3 shows correlation matrix for those 
variables.  Table 2.4 presents the results for the second pass regressions. I run second pass 
regressions with OLS model. The results show that initial press freedom significantly explains 
excess returns in each economy.  As expected, initial press freedom has a negative relationship 
with excess return.  An increase in initial press freedom means more freedom in the country, 
leading to a more transparent and less risky investment environment which, in turn, requires less 
excess return for stocks.  
As shown in model 4 of table 2.4, if initial press freedom increases by one point investors 
might require 0.266 per cent less in expected annual excess return.  The coefficient is significant 
at the 10% level. However, the results from OLS regressions might not as reliable as results from 
the fixed-effect models I discuss below since the fixed-effect models capture variation across 
countries. We, therefore, can safely ignore the OLSs’ results and focus on fixed-effect models’ 
ones.    
 
4.2 Fixed Effect (FE) Model  
 
I also use one-way fixed effect model to test my hypothesis.  Time series estimates of the 
asset beta and gammas are obtained in the first pass by ordinary least square (OLS).  The 
dependent variable in the first pass is the monthly excess return of stock portfolio over the risk 
free rate for each country.  I use equally-weighted portfolio based on the firms in each country to 
reduce the idiosyncratic risk.  In this method, beta and gammas are assumed to change over time.  
In the first pass regression, I use data of previous 5 years and 5 years ahead to estimate beta and 
gammas for each country portfolio at time t.  For instance, data from 1986 to 1990 are used to 
estimate beta and gammas for a country portfolio in 1986.  Beta and gammas for that country 
portfolio in 1987 will be estimated using data from 1986 to 1991, so on and so forth.  The fixed-
19 
 
effect model is likely to give more reliable results than OLS since the model captures country-
level variation.  Additionally, the model allows beta and gammas to vary over time. In reality, 
betas and gammas often change through time due to continuous development in each country and 
the global economy as well.  Allowing beta and gammas to be time-variant, therefore, is more 
realistic than keeping those coefficients constant and might reduce errors-in-variables bias.   
The betas and gammas in the first pass regression are assumed to capture most of the 
systematic risk in financial markets.  I use estimated beta and gammas from first pass as 
explanatory variables for excess returns of stocks in the Fixed Effect model.  I also incorporate 
other explanatory variables in the second pass to test the hypothesis.  The specification for the 
regression in the first pass is as follows: 
 rit – rft = αit + βit 
W
 (rWt – rft) + γit (rext – rft) + εit          (1’) 
The first pass is run for every country individually and each country has time-varying 
estimated beta and gammas.  rit is the monthly return of equally-weighted portfolio for country 
i at time t.  rW is the return on the World indices, rf is the risk – free rate of US one – month 
treasury bill, rex is a vector of return on exchange rates.  In this study, I assume that foreign 
investors use the following strong currencies for majority of trading: U.S. Dollar; German Mark; 
Japanese Yen and British Pound.  The dataset is available from 1986 to 2000, so the Euro is not 
included.  Return on exchange rate is calculated using four mentioned currencies.  
I run a one-way Fixed Effect (FE) model for the second pass regression.  The second pass 
regression uses the estimated betas and gammas from the first pass as independent regressors.  
This step estimates the effect of freedom of the press on excess returns on each market.  The 
second pass regression is as follows:  
rit – rft=a +b βit 
W
+ c γit +d ∆ (Press freedom)it+ e Initial(Press freedom)it+ f Xit + ηit  (2’)  
where rit is the annual return of equally-weighted portfolio for country i at time t.  rft is the risk – 
free rate of US one–year treasury bill.   βit
W
 is the estimated beta of world excess return for 
country i.  γit is the estimated gamma for exchange rate return for country i.  Xit is a vector of 
control variables.  Initial press freedom is the average of all previous press freedom scores at 
time t.  ∆(Press freedom) refers to the change in press freedom in one year for each country.  
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∆(Press freedom)t is the difference between press freedom at time t and initial press freedom at 
time t.  
Table 2.5 presents results for the FE model.  As shown in model 4 of table 2.5, an 
increase of one point in initial press freedom might result in a decrease of 0.15 per cent in 
expected annual excess return.  The coefficient is significant at the 10% level. ∆(Press 
freedom)’s coefficient has the expected sign but is not significant.  Coefficients of other control 
variables such as corruption, internal conflict and external conflict have the same signs and 
significance.  For robustness checks, I also run FE model using estimated beta and gammas from 
Fama-French and OLS method in the first pass regressions. The results are presented in table 2.7 
and 2.8.  
It is also worth noting that survivorship bias might be an issue for this study. Due to the 
nature of data from EMDB 2000 it is likely that only survivor firms in emerging markets are 
included in my sample. That might create an upward bias in excess returns of stocks. 
There are reasons to be concerned about autocorrelation in asset returns.  To test for 
autocorrelation I use Durbin-Watson test for first autocorrelation.  The results show that Durbin-
Watson statistics is 2.06.  That indicates no autocorrelation in asset returns. To further test 
autocorrelation, I use a Breusch-Godfrey test for 5 lags.  The results also show no 
autocorrelation.  
 
5. Robustness Checks 
5.1 An Alternative Approach to Calculate Stock Returns 
 
The empirical framework in this study starts from the international investors’ perspectives.  
International investors are concerned about real returns after controlling for inflation.  That 
requires stock returns to be converted to a same currency or adjusted for inflation.  I choose the 
U.S dollar as a common currency in this study since it is widely accepted in international 
finance.  One way to check the robustness of my finding is to use inflation-adjusted stock returns 
as dependent variable.  In this alternative method, I first calculate normal returns for stocks 
without converting to dollar.  Then, I obtain real returns on stocks by applying the formula 
(1+Nominal Return Rate) = (1+Real Return Rate)*(1+Inflation Rate).  The inflation rates data 
are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator.  The data range is from 1985-2000. 
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Real return rates then are used in the models.  The results shown in table 2.4 and 2.5 are 
consistent with my previous findings.  
Results in model 5 of table 2.4 and table 2.5 indicate a negative relationship between 
initial press freedom and excess return.  If initial press freedom increases by one point investors 
might require 0.227 per cent and 0.102 per cent less in expected annual excess return, 
respectively.  The coefficients are significant at the 10% level.  However, the second variable, ∆ 
(Press freedom), is not significant.  Other control variables from ICRG have coefficients 
unchanged in terms of sign and significance.   
 
5.2 An Alternative Approach for Assessing Systematic Risk Factors  
 
In order to test the robustness of the paper’s results, I use the Fama-French three-factor 
model.  The three Fama-French factors used to explain returns on equity market are market risk, 
market value over book value, and size of firms.  The size factor refers to the excess returns that 
small firms may create over big firms.  Small firms have more future opportunities to grow and 
generate higher return compared to larger, more mature companies.  SMB (“small-minus-big”) 
stands for the size factor in the Fama-French model. SMB is designed to capture the additional 
return investors have historically earned by investing in relatively small market-size firms. 
However, the additional return is not free. That comes with additional risk. Small firms are 
usually more sensitive to many risk factors due to their limited resources and ability to absorb 
negative financial events.  Therefore, the additional return is often referred to as the “size 
premium”.  According to Fama and French (1993), the SMB factor is the average return on three 
small portfolios minus the average return on three big portfolios. SMB variable is calculated as 
follows, 
SMB = 1/3 (Small Value + Small Neutral + Small Growth) – 1/3 (Big Value + Big 
Neutral + Big Growth) 
 
On the other hand, the HML (“high-minus-low”) factor measures the additional return 
generated for investment in companies with high book-to-market ratio.  Book value is the 
accounting value of firm’s total assets.  Market value is the value of firm’s capitalization.  Firms 
with high book-to-value ratio are categorized as “value” firms.  Firms with low book-to-value 
ratio are called “growth” firms.  The HML factor suggests that firms with high book-to-market 
ratio usually have higher risk compared to firms with lower one.   High book-to-market ratio 
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usually indicates that firm’s public market value has reduced due to hard times or uncertain 
future earnings.  Firms with high book-to-market value, therefore, might be exposed to greater 
risk than firms with lower ratio.  As a result, investors who invest in high book-to-market ratio 
should receive higher returns.  Thus, the HML factor is often referred as the “value premium”.  
According to Fama and French (1993), the HML factor is the average return on two value 
portfolios minus the average return on two growth portfolios. HML variable is calculated as 
follows, 
HML = 1/2 (Small Value + Big Value) – 1/2 (Small Growth + Big Growth)  
 
The Fama-French three factor model states that SMB and HML are the main factors 
explaining excess returns for equity markets. I obtain data for SMB and HML for global factors 
on Fama-French website
2
.  The Fama-French three factor model is used to estimate betas and 
gammas for the first pass regression.  I then use estimated betas and gammas from the first pass 
for the second pass regression.  I run both OLS and FE model in the second pass regressions.  
For the OLS model in second pass regression, the first pass regression after incorporating 
SMB and HML is specified as follows: 
rit – rft = αit +  βi 
W
 (rWt – rft) + γi
W
 (rext – rft) + si SMBit + hi HMLit + εit        (3) 
The robustness of my findings is demonstrated in the second pass results, summarized in 
table 2.6, which shows that the coefficient of initial press freedom is still negative and significant 
at the 10% level.  According to the results in model 4 and 5 of table 2.6, if initial press freedom 
increases by one point investors might require 0.35 per cent and 0.27 per cent less in expected 
annual excess return, respectively.  The coefficients are significant at the 10% level. Other 
control variables’ coefficients from ICRG stay unchanged in sign and significance.  These results 
are consistent with my previous findings.    
I also use FE model for the second pass regression to test the robustness of the results.  
The time-varying beta and gammas are estimated following the method descried in part 4.2.  The 
first pass regression model after incorporating SMB and HML is specified as follows: 
rit – rft = αit +  βit 
W
 (rWt – rft) + γit
W
 (rext – rft) + si SMBit + hi HMLit + εit        (3’) 
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Table 2.7 presents the results for the robustness checks.  Model 4 and 5 of table 2.7 
indicate that if initial press freedom increases by one point investors might require 0.16 per cent 
and 0.26 per cent less in expected annual excess return, respectively.  The coefficients are 




The important role of sound institutions is widely agreed upon in the economic development 
literature.  In this recognized list of institutions, the role of media is becoming ever more 
significant.  In this view, the media constitute an essential institution that, if made effective and 
unbiased, can help an economy progress by creating a useful information channel and acting as a 
handcuff for a leviathan government.  Media, including print, television, and internet play a 
unique role in informing and shaping the public idea of an economy.  They pervade society and 
have an immediate impact on the population at large. In the financial literature, information is 
one of the most important elements in the stock price determination process.  Thus, media, acting 
as providers of considerable information, also exert a powerful influence on stock markets.  
While many researchers have studied the effect of asymmetric information on volatility and risk 
in financial markets, the role of media in reducing that risk has not been thoroughly investigated.  
I use the concept of press freedom as a proxy for media freedom in this study.  
Enhancement of press freedom will reduce economic and political risk in an economy.   Such 
economies create a better investment environment with lower systematic risk conditions for all 
investors, if investors are better provided with truthful and in-time necessary information relating 
to all economic and political activities.  Well-informed investors, in return, provide immense 
capital at relatively low cost for the economy.  They might require less expected return for the 
low economic and political risk. Therefore, there might be a relationship between press freedom 
and expected return required by investors.  This paper investigates how a free press affects 
expected returns in the stock markets of emerging countries where press freedom fluctuated 
markedly.  The results suggest that initial press freedom has a negative relationship with 
expected returns in the stock market.  The expected return will be higher than average in a 
country with less press freedom which is consistent with the idea that less press freedom reflects 
higher systematic risk for investors.  An economy with less press freedom also creates more 
asymmetric information situations in which insiders and important information possessors can 
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have greater opportunities to generate abnormal returns by taking advantage of others.   My 
findings also indicate that change in press freedom which is captured by ∆(Press freedom) has a 
positive relationship with excess returns. Although the coefficients are insignificant the result is 
still worth noting.  In a country with better media freedom, information provided to investors 
will have higher quality, government and business sectors are supposed to be more accountable.  
Investors might become more optimistic and confident about future economy.  They might invest 
more in financial markets, boost prices of financial assets and produce higher excess returns.  As 
a result, the change in media freedom is argued to have positive relationship with excess returns. 
However, investors might incorporate all available information into assets’ prices quickly.  
Financial assets’ prices, therefore, might respond to change in press freedom rapidly then adjust 
toward long-term equilibrium. The adjustment process might take less than a week or a month. 
Since the data for press freedom are annual it might not be enough to capture short-term effects 
of the change in press freedom on the stock markets. That might be the reason why the 
coefficients of ∆(Press freedom) are not significant.  
The robustness check provides consistent results with some alternative methods and 
datasets for press freedom.  The Fama-French three - factor model is used to test the hypothesis. 
Several control variables are included to account for corruption, internal and external conflict, 
which can affect the systematic risk of equity markets.  These conclusions are still robust when 
these control variables are included.  This conclusion strongly justifies the hypothesis that more 
press freedom reduces systematic risk by providing more transparency and is crucial to develop 




Table 2.1: Variables and Sources 
Variable Sources 
Closing Price Indices EMDB (2000) Database 
Local Price Indices EMDB (2000) Database 
World Index MSCI International Database 
Risk Free Rate Fama French Database 
SMB, HML Fama French Database 
Press Freedom Index Freedom House Database 
Corruption Index ICRG Database 








Table 2.2: Overall Summary Statistics 
 Observations Mean S.D Minimum Maximum 
Initial Press Freedom 240 48.6 12.5 40 73 
Delta Press Freedom 240 2.14 3.36 -11.5 14 
Stocks Traded 672 -0.12 0.14 -0.15 2.22 
Corruption 240 3.922 2.365 1 6 
Internal Conflict 240 7.23 2.46 1 12 






Table 2.3: Correlation Matrix of Press Freedom and ICRG Variables 
 
 














1 0.048 -0.297 -0.121 -0.016 -0.025 
Delta Press 
Freedom 
 1 0.082 -0.093 0.018 -0.004 
Excess Return    1 -0.156 -0.121 -0.218 
Mean Corruption    1 0.161 0.127 
Mean Internal 
Conflict 
    1 0.342 
Mean External 
Conflict 




Table 2.4: OLS - Second pass regression with fixed beta, gammas 



































































Gamma for German Marc 1.04 1.68 1.75 1.45 0.86 
 (1.42) (1.57) (1.94) (1.29) (0.75) 




















Delta Corruption 0.27 
(0.22) 




Initial Corruption -1.25* 
(0.64) 


































N 240 240 240 240 240 
R
2 
0.075 0.082 0.074 0.112 0.108 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1                                  Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
Fixed beta and gammas are estimated in the first pass regressions, as in equation (1); OLS model is used for the 
second pass regressions. 
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Table 2.5: FE - Second pass regression with time-varying beta, gammas 






































































































Delta Corruption 0.242 
(0.26) 




Initial Corruption -1.98* 
(1.07) 


































N 240 240 240 240 240 
R
2 
0.172 0.178 0.173 0.224 0.217 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1                       Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
Time-varying beta and gammas are estimated in the first pass regressions, as in equation (1’); FE models are used 




Table 2.6: Robustness Checks - OLS - Second pass regression with Fama-French Three-Factor Model and 



































































Gamma for German Marc 1.54 1.36 1.56 1.33 0.47 
 (1.61) (1.42) (1.54) (1.49) (0.41) 




















Delta Corruption 0.17 
(0.25) 




Initial Corruption -1.14* 
(0.66) 


































N 240 240 240 240 240 
R
2 
0.082 0.078 0.086 0.122 0.114 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.                      Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.  
Fixed beta and gammas are estimated in the first pass regressions with Fama-French factors, as in equation (3); OLS 
model is used for the second pass regressions. 
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Table 2.7: Robustness Checks - FE - Second pass regression with Fama-French Three- 







































































































Delta Corruption 0.42 
(0.46) 




Initial Corruption -1.48* 
(0.81) 


































N 240 240 240 240 240 
R
2 
0.155 0.157 0.163 0.203 0.214 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1                        Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
Time-varying beta and gammas are estimated in the first pass regressions with Fama-French factors, as in equation 




Table 2.8: List of Countries 
Argentina  Malaysia 
China  Nigeria 
Chile Russia 
Colombia Philippines 





Figure 2.1: Press Freedom Scores for Some Developing Countries   
 






Figure 2.2: Press Freedom Scores for Some Developed Countries   
 
Source: Freedom House Index 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Stock Returns and Press Freedom in Nigeria from 1994 to 2000. 
 
 




Corruption Heterogeneity and  
Foreign Direct Investment 
 
“ If you look under most banking crises, there’s always a degree of fraud and abuse, and there’s 
often a large amount of criminal activity. Corruption threatens growth and stability in many other 
ways as well: by discouraging business, undermining legal notions of property rights and 
perpetuating vested interests.” 
Lawrence Summers 
Speech to the Summit of Eight, Denver, June 10, 1997 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper analyzes the relationship between inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
corruption levels between investor and recipient countries.  I address the specific question “Does 
FDI tend to flow among two countries with similar corruption level?”  The general view is that 
corruption is detrimental to an economy (Shleifer and Vishny 1993).  Corruption also has the 
potential to discourage FDI inflows (Mauro 1995).  Wei (1998) shows that there exists a negative 
relationship between corruption levels in host countries and FDI inflow.  However, it is far from 
the point where a complete agreement about role of corruption on FDI is reached.  Soreide 
(2004, 2006) shows that foreign investors and multinational enterprises (MNEs) are not always 
deterred by corruption and appear to be very adjustable to local business environment and even 
engage in corruption.  Indeed, Larrain and Tavares (2004) find that FDI might be a vehicle 
fighting corruption.  This paradox requires more careful and specific study on the impact of 
corruption on FDI. 
Cross-border flows of direct investment have grown remarkably in the past twenty years.  
According to Held et al. (1999), total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has grown at a faster 
speed than the income of the world since 1960s, and MNEs contribute more than 70 percent to 
world trade.  Although MNEs are the most significant sources of FDI, an individual, a firm or a 
government can also participate in this investment process. Due to decreasing restriction on 
global capital movement, FDI has increasingly become important for countries.   Lipsey (2001) 
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shows that FDI inflow in many countries recover in a shorter period of time than do portfolio and 
debt flows during financial crises.  FDI has become a more favorable capital source for 
developing countries due to that characteristic.  
FDI contributes to growth in host countries in a several ways.  It allows the transfer of 
new technology, management skills, etc. that cannot be achieved by trade in goods and services 
or financial investment.  Much empirical research shows a larger impact on productivity and 
income growth by FDI than by domestic investment.  The reason is that FDI firms enhance the 
quality and volume of goods produced due to advanced technology (Lipsey and Sjholm, 2004).  
Bosworth et al. (1999) argues that FDI has positive effects on domestic economy of 58 
developing countries during 1978-1995.  In that study, Bosworth investigates the impact of three 
different types of investment inflows: FDI, portfolio investment, and other financial flows 
(mainly bank loans).  He was able to show that impact of FDI on domestic investment almost 
double that of capital flows.  The study also indicates that FDI is beneficial enough to offset the 
evident risk of free capital movement across borders for developing countries.  FDI will also 
create a spillover effect in technology across countries through the channels of imitation, 
franchise, training or competition (Lensink and Morrissey 2001).  Lensink and Morrissey (2001) 
also argue that the existence of an educated labor force in host countries and a developed 
domestic financial system have positive impacts on economic growth.   
There is a rich literature on the determinants of FDI decisions.  A large body of literature 
studies the partial equilibrium and suggests that a MNE’s FDI decisions depend on some factors 
such as cheap labor, local markets, taxes, trade protection and regulation (Froot and Stein 1991).  
The quality of institutions is also an important determinant of FDI.  Poor private property 
protection increases the chance of expropriation and diminishes FDI inflow.  Poor quality of 
institutions or corruption also increases the cost of investment and, thus, discourages FDI activity 
(See Hartman 1984, 1985).  Last but not least, poor institution or corruption usually leads to poor 
infrastructure and results in low profitability for foreign investors.  
Corruption is one indicator for institution quality in a country.  There is empirical 
evidence showing the negative impacts of corruption on domestic investment and economic 
growth.   However, the evidence of corruption on FDI is still ambiguous. Wei (2000) shows that 
corruption is negatively correlated with FDI.  Wheeler and Mody (1992), on the other hand, finds 
no significant impact of corruption on FDI.  Hines (1995) also fails to find that type of 
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connection.  Understanding the effect of corruption on FDI is crucial since corruption might 
create uncertainty in economic policy as well as unethical competition in business and increase 
cost of doing business.  By doing so, corruption might also bring unreasonable advantages to 
some firms and distort the markets.  That will likely push the economy out of a Pareto optimal 
state.     
While most previous research ignores the heterogeneity of investors, this paper argues 
that investors are heterogeneous in their ability to adjust to corruption in the FDI host country.  
Adjusting ability might be determined by numerous factors including language, culture, 
experience, financial position and market power.  When facing a high cost of bribes and 
corruption in a host country, foreign investors can opt to invest or stay out.  Some foreign 
investors appear to be very flexible in adjusting their activities to the local political environment 
and practices, while others even actively engage in corruption.  In fact, investors from corrupt 
countries might learn from their experience and adapt at a faster rate in another corrupt country.  
Experience in managing corruption may help to bring about a certain comparative advantage.  As 
a result, firms from corrupt countries may be more successful in bribing local officers and 
surviving in new environment.  On the other hand, firms from less corrupt countries might 
encounter more difficulty bribing local officers.  They, therefore, will become more reluctant to 
invest in those host countries.  This situation might be the reverse if host countries are less 
corrupt.  Using a panel of 189 countries over 1995-2008 period, the paper empirically tests the 
hypothesis that FDI inflow is negatively correlated with corruption, yet FDI is positively 
correlated with the homogeneity in corruption levels between two countries.  The regression 
results support the hypothesis and send out a policy implication that developing countries should 
reduce corruption to attract FDI from less corrupt countries.  FDI from less corrupt countries 
might be more beneficial to receiving countries than FDI from highly corrupt ones. 
2. Foreign Investment and Corruption     
In this section, I discuss the main theoretical and empirical studies on the determinants of FDI 
flows and impact of corruption on FDI.  The literature explains two motives of FDI.  The first 
motive is that foreign firms aim at reducing trade frictions through horizontal diversification 
(Markusen, 1984).  The other motive is for firms to take advantage of abundant resources in host 
countries such as cheap labor and low-priced minerals through vertical investment (Helpman, 
1984).  Dunning (1988) provides an alternative “OLI” paradigm to explain FDI activities, where 
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“O” stands for ownership, “L” is for location and “I” for internationalization.  According to 
Dunning (1998), firms internationalize their business through FDI with their ownership.  They 
exploit internationally their specific skills, resources and capital to reduce transaction and 
transportation cost. “L” explains the spatial aspect of FDI activities.  Firms’ decisions on FDI 
locations depend on the search for abundant resources, cheap labors, big markets and efficiency.   
Looking at the aggregate level, Anderson and Wincoop (2003) argue that main 
determinants of FDI include country size, factor endowments and distance.  Eckholm, Forslid 
and Markusen (2003) provide evidence that foreign firms may invest into one country to build up 
production facilities then export to a group of neighbor countries in that region.  Brenton et al. 
(1999) provides evidence that trade openness might be associated with FDI activities.  
Nonnenberg et al. (2004) contend that there is positive relationship between size of the host 
country, skilled labor availability, economic growth and inflow FDI.  They also find that country 
risk level and inflation has a negative impact on FDI inflows.  
However, it is more difficult to model all available theories.  Brainard (1993) is the first 
one to tackle the issue.  She uses a model to study horizontal FDI in different sectors of 
monopolistic and perfectly competitive markets.  Brainard (1997) provides evidence that trade 
cost and production facility size measured by firm export volume relative to total foreign sales 
are associated with FDI.  Markusen (1997) studies behavior of FDI-firms by developing 
“knowledge-capital model”.  He shows that factor endowments, trade volume, host market sizes 
and FDI frictions may have significant impact on FDI inflows.  Carr, Markusen and Maskus 
(2001) further test the “knowledge-capital model” using the data for aggregate sales of FDI-firms 
in US from 1986-1994.  They show that the model predicts reasonably well for both horizontal 
and vertical FDI. According to Yeaple (2003b), factor endowment differences in which host 
country has comparative advantage may increase FDI for industries that intensively use that 
factor. This finding may be seen in vertical FDI activities.  
A number of authors use spatial econometric techniques to estimate the effect of 
interdependence on FDI activity.  Coughlin and Segev (2000) show that FDI inflow in a Chinese 
province may increase FDI inflow in neighbor provinces.  According to Hansen, Rand and Tarp 
(2003), FDI also has a crowding-out effect on neighbor regions. Blonigen, Davies, Waddell and 
Naughton (2004) also indicate that FDI to a country may have a negative impact on FDI to a 
neighbor country.  Baltagi, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004), however, find mixed evidence that 
37 
 
lightly supports export-platform motivations in the data.  These studies show that spatial 
interdependence may have impact on FDI inflows.  However, the sample that the authors choose 
in geographic space to estimate might bias the results.   
Another generally-accepted hypothesis is that higher taxes discourage FDI. However, 
Hartman (1984; 1985) argue that certain types of FDI may not be very sensitive to taxes.  The 
reason is that earnings by an affiliate in foreign country will be subject to parent and host country 
taxes.  On the other hand, firms need to transfer money from the parent to the affiliate for new 
investment and, thus, will pay foreign taxes.  Due to this, firms will want to utilize retained 
earnings as much as possible for making new investments.  Hartman (1984) confirms this 
hypothesis by showing that retained earnings FDI is positively correlated with the host country 
tax.  Scholes and Wolfson (1990) also indicate that US inflow FDI is positively associated with 
US tax rates.  Swenson (1994) echoes Scholes and Wolfson in his study on the impact of the 
1986 US tax reform on FDI in US.  Auerbach and Hassett (1993), however, refute the Scholes 
and Wolfson argument by showing that US tax rates increase will reduce FDI inflows.   
  Some of theoretical works on FDI focus on how the investment cost affects the decision 
between trading and FDI.  Antras and Helpman (2002, 2003) argue that better property 
protection enhances FDI instead of trading.  The quality of institutions is also an important 
determinant of FDI inflows, especially for less-developed countries for several reasons.  Poor 
legal protection of assets is one of the reasons.  The lack of legal protection of assets increases 
the chance of expropriation and discourages foreign investments.  Poor quality of institutions 
also decreases market functions, increases the cost of doing business and dampens FDI activity.  
Additionally, poor institutions are usually associated with poor transportation and information 
infrastructure, which reduces attractiveness for FDI.  
Among several institutional quality indicators, this paper discusses the impact of 
corruption on FDI.  Corruption is considered one indicator of institutional quality and is defined 
as the misuse of public office for private gain (See Bardhan 1997).  Wei (2000) studies the 
impact of corruption on FDI using data from 14 source countries and 45 host countries.  His 
study shows that corruption is negatively correlated with FDI.  According to Habib and 
Zurawicki (2002) and Egger and Winner (2006), corruption is detrimental to FDI but its effect 
are not uniform across industries.  Hakkala et al. (2008) finds that corruption has a more negative 
impact on horizontal than on vertical FDI.  Smarzynska and Wei (2000) argue that corruption 
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will move FDI investment more toward joint ventures instead of wholly owned affiliates.  
According to Lambsdorff and Cornelius (2000), corruption also has a negative effect on FDI 
inflows in African countries. Dahlstrom and Johnson (2007) demonstrate that corruption has a 
negative impact on FDI but only for developing and more corrupt countries.  Wei and Wu (2001) 
argue that corruption not only dampens FDI inflows but also makes the economy rely more on 
bank loans.  The economy, therefore, might be more vulnerable to currency or financial crises. 
Habib and Zurawicki (2001) investigate the relative impact of corruption on FDI and domestic 
investment and find that corruption has a stronger effect on FDI.  Other studies also look at the 
impact of corruption on other aspects of the economy.  Mauro (1995) implies that corruption has 
a strong linkage with perpetuation of inefficiency.  Davoodi, Gupta and Alonso-Terme (1998) 
argue that corruption dampens the economy and worsens poverty.   
Another trend of literature investigates the connection between source and destination 
country corruption.  Dunning (1998) argues that firms are heterogeneous in many specific 
aspects including capital sources, management skills, and business environment.  Firms in 
corrupt countries are more adaptable to their home-country environment and therefore will be 
more adjustable in another corrupt country through FDI.  Buckley et al. (2007) shows that FDI 
from China is inclined to countries with weak institutions and a high level of state involvement.  
Morck et al. (2008) finds the same evidence as Buckley.  According to a study by Delios (2005) 
with OECD data, the corruption level in a receiving country might not affect Japanese firms’ FDI 
decisions.  Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008) further investigate the issue with data from 
developing countries.  They find that firms from developing countries tend to invest more in less 
developed countries with weak institutions.  Sima-Eichler (2006) studies the impact of stricter 
sanctions of home government on firms who bribe abroad, and find that such restrictions might 
decrease FDI to corrupt countries.      
However, some research show inconclusive results about the connection between 
corruption and FDI.  Wheeler and Mody (1992) look at US data on foreign firms and find no 
significant relationship between corruption level and FDI.  Alesina and Weder (1999) find no 
evidence for a negative impact of corruption on FDI.  Henisz (2000) investigates the impact of 
corruption on competition and finds a small effect of corruption. Okeahalam and Bah (1998) also 
indicate no significant connection between corruption and FDI using data from Sub-Saharan 
African countries.  On the other hand, Larrain and Tavares (2004) find that FDI might be a 
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vehicle for fighting corruption.  In summary, the overall impression is that corruption seems to 
have negative and differential impacts on type and volume of FDI. 
3. Description of the Data 
This paper uses several sources of data.  The dependent variable in this paper is bilateral FDI. 
The data for bilateral FDI come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 1995-
2008.  FDI is measured annually in millions of dollars and adjusted for purchasing power parity.  
There are 189 countries in my dataset.  The number of observations for one year, therefore, is at 
maximum 35,532 (189 x 188).  Since the dataset is for 14 years the maximum number of 
observations in the data is 497,448 (35,532 x 14).  The dataset includes almost every country in 
the world including developed, developing and transition economies.  
The main independent variable that I am interested in is a Corruption Index.  It is not easy 
to measure corruption.  Most corrupt dealings are secret.  Therefore, objective measures are 
rarely available.  So far, researchers have not totally agreed with any specific index.  Most of the 
available data on corruption used by researchers are subjective, and are derived from 
questionnaire based surveys.  The indexes calculated from those surveys measure the perception 
of corruption rather than corruption itself. Interestingly, the available indexes are highly 
correlated (Tanzi, 1998).  There are three available datasets for corruption that I use in this study.  
The first set of data is Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency International (TI).  
The TI is scaled from 0 (most corrupt) to 9 (least corrupt).  Other sources of corruption indices 
come from World Bank Control of Corruption (CC) and International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG). I use those sources for a robustness check.  The index from World Bank Control of 
Corruption (CC) measures corruption from 1 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt).  The 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index goes from 1 (most corrupt) to 6 (least corrupt). 
Corruption index is annual data.  For the convenience of the study, I rescale the data so that high 
figures refer to a higher corruption.  For example, TI index equals 10 minus the original TI 
index; ICRG index equals 7 minus original ICRG index.  
Other sets of data include control variables that are the main determinants of FDI 
suggested in the literature.  A brief discussion of the control variables follows.  First, most 
literature has pointed out that multinational firms invest abroad to exploit potential markets and 
increase profitability.  Therefore, new market size is one important factor that determines FDI 
decision.  GDP or population can be a good proxy for market size.  I use GDP and population as 
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proxies for market size in host countries.  GDP data are obtained from the World Development 
Indicators1995-2008.  Population data come from Penn World Tables. 
FDI inflows will be easy to operate in a country with much of trading activities or 
investment.  Trade openness is an early signal and a pre-condition for a country to successfully 
attract FDI inflows.  Foreign firms will also find it more compelling to invest in a country where 
they can freely import necessary inputs or export finished products.  Otherwise, foreign firms 
will hardly put their capital in the country.  Due to this, I consider trade openness to be one of 
explanatory variables.  Trade openness is calculated as percentage of imports and export in total 
GDP in a year.  I collect data for trade from the World Development Indicators 1995-2008.  
One might argue that firms might want to transfer a production facility abroad to take 
advantage of cheap labor sources.  That might reduce production cost and increase the 
profitability for firms.  Labor cost, therefore, might be an important determinant of FDI.  I use 
average percentage of annual wage in manufacturing industry over GDP per capita in host 
countries to as a proxy for labor costs.  Wage data is taken from the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) database from 1995 – 2008.  
The argument of cheap labor cost might explain FDI flows from developed to developing 
countries (mostly in the form of vertical integration).  In this form, firms aim at reducing 
production cost by hiring cheap labors or exploring their new markets.  However, we also 
observe enormous FDI flows among developed countries (mostly in the form of horizontal 
integration).  In this kind of investment, firms might search for high-skilled specialists or 
cooperation in high technology with other companies.  To account for this difference, I create 
dummy variables for all countries that are members of OECD up to 2008.   
Political stability might be a strong factor to determine FDI.  Foreign firms have tendency 
to avoid countries in civil war or in chaotic politics.  Those countries are viewed as bad locations 
for long run investment.  I collect data for political risk from International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG). The higher political risk index reflects a more stable political environment in that 
country.  
Another possible reason that might explain FDI inflows is the abundance of natural 
resources.  Many foreign firms have incentive to invest and exploit rich endowment of natural 
resources in developing countries.  This paper, therefore, uses natural resources as an 
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explanatory variable.  I obtain data for natural resources from the World Development Indicators 
1995-2008.  
In the literature, some studies argue that firms tend to invest in host countries with 
similarity in culture, language and geographical location.  It is reasonable that Spanish firms are 
likely to choose host countries in Latin America.  It is a similar situation for Hong Kong or 
Taiwanese firms to invest in China.  Distance between home and host countries also matters.   
Shorter distance will facilitate FDI and save transportation costs for foreign companies.   I use a 
dummy variable for language tie as a proxy for culture and language proximity.  The dummy 
variable takes a value of 1 if home and host countries share the same language and 0 otherwise.  
Data on language similarity comes from Frankel et al. (1995).  Data on geographical distance 
comes from Hengeveld (1996).  
Finally, my main empirical question is to what extent the similarity in corruption levels 
between two countries will affect bilateral FDI.  I, therefore, include an additional explanatory 
variable named Corruption difference, defined as the absolute difference between corruption 
levels of home and host countries.  
My dataset includes a panel data of 189 countries in the period from 1995 – 2008.  
4. Empirical Results  
This section discusses the empirical results.  My hypothesis is that FDI inflow is negatively 
correlated with corruption, yet FDI is positively correlated with homogeneity in corruption levels 
between two countries.  My empirical models include two types of estimation methods, OLS and 
Tobit.  I use Tobit to take into account the fact that there are a significant numbers of 0 
observations in my sample.  The benchmark specification to test the hypothesis is suggested by 
most of researchers in literature (See Wei (2000), Habib, M., and Zurawicki, L. (2002)).  The 
regression equation is as follows: 
 
Log (FDIijt) = βo + β1 Corruptionjt + β2 Corruption_Differenceijt  
+β3 Log (GDPjt) + β4 Log (Population) + β5 Trade_Opennessjt + β6 Wagejt                 (1)    
+ β7 Natural_Resourcesjt + β8 (Political Stabilityjt) + β9 Log (Distanceij)  
+ β10 Languageij + εjt    
where FDIijt is the total amount of FDI from source country i to host country j at time t. 
Corruptionjt is corruption level in country j at time t.  Corruption_Differenceijt is the absolute 
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value of difference in corruption levels between country i and country j at time t. GDPjt and 
Populationjt are GDP and population of country j at time t, respectively. Trade_Opennessjt 
measures how open the economy of country j at time t is. Trade_Opennessjt is calculated as 
percentage of total imports and exports in GDP of country j at time t. This is a common way to 
estimate the openness in trade of an economy (Habib and Zurawicki 2002).  Wagejt is the 
percentage of average annual wage in manufacturing in dustry over GDP per capita in country j.  
Natural_Resources refers to the abundance of natural resources in country j at time t.  Political 
Stabilityjt measures political risk in country j at time t.  Log (Distanceij) reflects geographical 
distance between country i and country j.  Languageij is dummy variable which has value of 1 if 
two countries speak a same language and 0 otherwise.  
Consistent with most of the literature, I expect that Corruption will have negative impact 
on FDI, but I also expect that countries with a smaller value of Corruption_Difference  might 
invest more in each other, and therefore have a higher level of FDI.  Thus, I predict negative 
coefficients for both the Corruption and Corruption_Difference variables.   Those are two main 
variables that this I am interested in. Additionally, standard theory predicts that GDP, 
Trade_Openness and Natural_Resources should have positive coefficients, and Wage should 
have a negative coefficient.   Natural_Resourcesjt is expected to have positive coefficient since 
firms will invest more in a country with abundant resources, for instance oil-exporting 
economies. As discussed in part 3, I also expect Log (Distanceij) to have negative coefficient, 
Political Stabilityjt and Languageij to have positive coefficients.  
Table 3.1 summarizes all sources of data used in this study.  Table 3.2 presents some 
descriptive statistics for the main variables.  Table 3.3 shows the correlation matrix for those 
variables.  Table 3.4 presents the results for the benchmark regression.  For the first regression, I 
include all variables as listed in equation (1) and use the corruption perception index (CPI) from 
Transparency International as one of explanatory variables. The results show that corruption, 
corruption difference, GDP, trade openness, wage, political stability, distance and language tie 
significantly explain FDI inflows.  All coefficients are significant at the 10% level.  As expected, 
the first column in table 3.4 shows that corruption has a negative relationship with FDI, with a 
coefficient of -0.26. It is not straightforward to interpret this coefficient.  According to the 
results, one point increase in corruption index is associated with a decrease of log (FDI) of 0.26.  
That equals a decrease of 22.9% of FDI.  In other words, if one country corruption level 
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decreases by 1 point on the scale of 10 that country may receive 22.9% more FDI.  The second 
variable that we are interested in is corruption_difference.  The results suggest that a decline in 
the absolute value of the difference in corruption level between two countries by one point is 
associated with an increase in the amount of bilateral FDI between the two of an estimated 
11.6%.  Other independent variables are also significant and have the sign as predicted.  
However, wage and natural_resources are insignificant. 
Column (2) of the table 3.4 reports results for fixed effect model.  I control for specific 
characters of different countries providing FDI.  Again, the results do not change much in terms 
of significance and signs for main explanatory variables.  According to the results, one point 
increase in corruption index is associated with a decrease of log (FDI) by 0.38.  That equals to a 
decrease of about 32% of FDI.  In other words, if one country corruption level decreases by 1 
point on the scale of 10 that country may receive about 32% more of inflow FDI.  The results 
also suggest that if absolute value of difference in corruption levels between two countries 
reduce by one point the amount of bilateral FDI between the two might increase by about 19%. 
To take into account the fact that  23% observations in my sample are zero, I rerun the 
regression using Tobit model.  These zero observations reflect the fact that some countries do not 
receive or invest to some certain countries.  Some countries are too far away from others to 
invest.  Some countries are too small and do not have capability to invest abroad; or firms in 
some countries do not want to take risk investing in corrupt countries.  In the case of zero or 
negative FDI, we have the classic censored-sample problem.  One way to fix the problem is to 
use Tobit model.  The Tobit specification will produce a larger estimate of effect of corruption 
on FDI compared to the OLS model.  In other words, the OLS model might produce a downward 
bias in the estimated coefficients of corruption variables since the model drops out all zero 
observations. 
Column (3) of the table 3.4 reports the results for Tobit specification.  The coefficients 
for our main explanatory variables do not change in sign or significance.  The results suggest that 
a decline in the absolute value of difference in corruption levels between two countries by one 




5. Robustness Checks 
5.1 Alternative indicators to measure corruption 
 
To check the robustness of my results, I rerun the regression using corruption data from 
other available sources.  I use two other available sources of corruption index for the robustness 
check.  Those come from World Bank Control of Corruption and ICRG, respectively.  Although 
indexes from other two sources are coded differently and derived from different surveys 
researchers find them highly correlated (See Wei, 2000).  Table 3.5 and 3.6 show the results with 
data from World Bank Control of Corruption and ICRG.  The results are consistent with the 
hypothesis and previous ones.  It also suggests that the effects of corruption in host country and 
corruption difference are almost the same in terms of coefficient value and significance.  All 
results point to the conclusion that corruption in host country and corruption difference between 
source and host country matter.  
Column (1) of the table 3.5 and 3.6 report the results for OLS specification.  The 
coefficients for the main explanatory variables do not change in sign or significance. The results 
suggest that one point decrease in absolute value of difference in corruption levels between two 
countries is associated with an estimated increase of around 17% and 20% in bilateral FDI 
between the two.  
 
5.2 Testing with different sample sets   
 
For more robustness checks, I divide the whole sample into two sub-samples for the corrupt 
countries and less corrupt countries.  Doing that might give more insight understandings about 
the effects of corruption in host country and corruption difference between source and host 
countries on FDI.  I arbitrarily choose 6 to be the threshold for my primary regressions, and later 
do some sensitivity analysis for this threshold.  Those countries with corruption perception index 
higher or equal 6 will belong to the group of corrupt economies.  Those with corruption 
perception index less than 6 are categorized as less corrupt.  The less corrupt sample includes 83 
countries.  The corrupt sample consists of 106 countries.  All observations are bilateral FDI 
between two countries within the group.  
 I run regressions for each group, including OLS, FE and Tobit models.  The results are 
reported in table 3.7.  As expected, most of our main coefficients (Corruption and Corruption 
Difference) do not change sign and significance.  The results increase the robustness of my 
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study.  It is also worth noting that coefficients for Trade Openness and Wage become 
insignificant for corrupt countries.  On the other hand, coefficient for Natural Resources becomes 
significant for the same sample set.  That might suggest that firms from corrupt countries invest 
in other corrupt economies to exploit abundant natural resources.  They do not focus on facilities 
to produce exporting goods.  Therefore, trade openness is not really important factor for them.  
 The regression results for less corrupt countries show another pattern. Coefficients for 
Trade Openness and Wage become significant.  The results might imply that investors from less 
corrupt countries utilize their comparative advantage in capital and technology in building new 
production facilities to take advantages of cheap labor and in-place natural resources.  Using 
those cheap production factors, they might reduce their product cost and increase competition 
ability in international trade.  To capitalize that increased competition ability, they need to rely 
on trade policy of host countries.  Trade openness, therefore, plays a significant role in decision 
making process of those investors. 
5.3 Endogeneity issue with corruption indexes 
One might be concerned about the endogeneity of the corruption variable.  One way to 
fix the problem of endogeneity is to use lagged corruption variable in the model to check the 
results.  Alternatively, I use instrumental variable for corruption.  An instrument variable is 
considered as a valid one if the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term in the equation of 
interest and it has some partial correlation with the endogenous regressor.  In the study, I use 
log(GDP per capita), trade openness, natural resources and political rights as instruments for 
corruption (Ades and De Tella 1999).  GDP per capita data is obtained from the World 
Development Indicators 1995-2008.  Trade openness is calculated as percentage of imports and 
export in total GDP in a year.  I also collect data for trade and natural resources from the World 
Development Indicators 1995-2008. Data for political rights from 1995 to 2008 come from 
Freedom House.  The political right index ranges from 0 (total freedom) to 100 (total repression).  
For the convenience of the study, I rescale the index from 0 (total repression) to 100 (total 
freedom).   
Table 3.8 shows the results for robustness check of endogeneity issue. The results 
indicate no significant changes in sign and significance for coefficients of the main explanatory 
variables.  I also test the endogeneity of corruption level using Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. The 




This paper investigates the relationship between corruption heterogeneity and bilateral FDI 
among countries.  Using data on 189 countries from 1995 to 2008, this paper empirically tests 
the hypothesis that FDI inflow is negatively correlated with corruption, yet FDI is also positively 
correlated with the similarity in corruption levels between two countries.  
 The empirical results support the hypothesis.  The results suggest that an increase of 1 
point of corruption index is associated with an estimated decrease of about 23% of FDI received 
by the country, and a decrease of 1 point in absolute value of difference in corruption levels 
between two countries is associated with an estimated increase of about 12% of bilateral FDI 
between the two.  The results also suggest that GDP, population, political stability, distance and 
language are also important determinants for FDI.  Wage, trade activities and natural resources 
are crucial for investors from less corrupt economies.  On the other hand, investors from corrupt 
countries may only take advantage of abundant natural resources in host countries.  
The findings imply that foreign firms act differently given corruption conditions in host 
countries.  Firms from less corrupt countries are unwilling to deal with unfair competition in 
highly corrupt business environment. On the other hand, firms from corrupt countries might feel 
more comfortable doing business in a corrupt economy.  Foreign firms in this situation might be 
considered as rent providers for local officials. Due to the increase in rent providers, local 
officials might not have any incentives to reduce the corruption level. As a result, increase in FDI 
from corrupt countries might worsen the corruption in host countries. Although FDI from corrupt 
economies might help to boost host economies in the short run it may leave behind a worse 




Table 3.1: Variables and Sources 
Variable Sources 
FDI World Development Indicator  
Corruption Transparency International, Control of 
Corruption and ICRG.  
GDP World Development Indicator 
Population 
Trade_Openness 
Penn World Table 
World Development Indicator 
Wage International Labor Organization 
Natural_Resources  
Political Stability  
Distance 
Language 
World Development Indicator 
International Country Risk Guide 
Hengeveld et al.(1996). 
Frankel et al. (1995) 
 
Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix of total dataset 









Corruption 1 -0.428 0.341 -0.327 -0.236 0.175 0.481 0.132 0.155 
GDP  1 0.235 0.554 0.317 -0.063 0.323 0.324 0.327 
Population   1 0.314 -0.286 0.352 - 0.318 -0.553 -0.329 
Trade_Openness    1 0.421 -0.375 -0.223 -0.128 0.471 
Wage     1 -0.232 0.382 -0.432 -.0412 
Natural_Resources      1 0.226 0.398 0.423 
Political Stability       1 -0.239 -0.392 
Distance        1 0.319 




Table 3.3: Overall Summary Statistics 
 Observations Mean S.D Minimum Maximum 
FDI 2,646 12,080.34 3,617.4 -2,835.2 32,315.66 
Corruption 2,646 3.905 1.2278 0 9 
GDP 2,646 6512.3 4385.61 82.01 14369.1 
Trade_Openness 2,646 0.68 0.29 0.11 3.29 
Wage 2,646 1.12 0.36 0.17 4.21 
Natural_Resources 2,646 0.63 0.57 0.15 0.77 
Political Stability 2,212 7.52 1.26 3 10 




Table 3.4: Regression Results with Corruption Index from TI 
(Dependent Variable = Log (FDI)) 
Independent Variables Estimates 
 (OLS) 
Estimates 











































Wage -1.25 - 1.24 -0.83 



































N 275,210 275,210 275,210 




Table 3.5: Regression Results with Corruption Index from ICRG 
(Dependent Variable = Log (FDI)) 
Independent Variables Estimates 
 (OLS) 
Estimates 











































Wage -1.78 -2.25 -1.18 



































N 275,210 275,210 275,210 




Table 3.6: Regression Results with Corruption Index from  
World Bank Control of Corruption 
(Dependent Variable = Log (FDI)) 
Independent Variables Estimates 
 (OLS) 
Estimates 











































Wage -2.38 -2.48 -2.45 



































N 275,210 275,210 275,210 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1      Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
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Table 3.7: Regression Results for Corrupt and Less Corrupt Countries.  
(Dependent Variable = Log (FDI)) 






































































































Wage -1.94 -0.65* - 1.78 -0.51*  -1.56  -0.38*  





































































N 184,732 90,478 184,732 90,478  184,732  90,478  
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.           Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
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Table 3.8: Regression Results with Corruption Index from TI, Corruption Endogenous 
 (Dependent Variable = Log (FDI)) 
Independent Variables Estimates 
 (OLS, Lagged Corruption) 
Estimates 































Wage -5.42 -1.18 




























N 275,210 275,210 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.           Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
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Chapter 4: Does FDI from Corrupt Countries Increase 
Corruption in Host Countries? 
 
 “Corruption is like a ball of snow, once it's set a rolling it must increase”  
Charles Caleb Colton 
 
1. Introduction 
Corruption is claimed to be one of the greatest obstacles to development in the world. 
International institutions and many independent researchers have tried to answer the question 
“why is corruption more pervasive in some countries than in others?”  Recent scandals in Russia, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, China, South Africa, Egypt, Vietnam and elsewhere have revealed that 
corruption is a global phenomenon.  In 1998, newly elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 
Pakistan said that foreign companies bribed officials of the previous government for electric 
plant projects, which resulted in high electricity prices.  He threatened to stop all those projects 
and cut the rates by more than 30 per cent
3
.  In some African countries, legal authorities have 
investigated some foreign companies due to their illegal payoffs to local government officials in 
several World Bank construction projects
4
.  In Russia, local officials announced that several 




These are a few examples among the hundreds of published and unpublished cases that 
reflect the connection between corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI). The general view 
is that corruption has negative impact on FDI (Shleifer and Vishny 1993).  However, these 
examples also suggest that the increase in FDI in developing countries might increase the 
likelihood of getting involved in corruption by local government officials.  The reason for this is 
that local governments have more opportunities to contact foreign firms if FDI increases.  By 
getting more contacts, they have more chances to misuse their power for their own interest.  
While previous research focuses on the negative impact of corruption on FDI inflow, it is 
also true that inbound FDI may have an impact on corruption levels in the host countries.  The 
                                                 
3
 Asian Wall Street Journal Ruling Puts Foreign Infrastructure Investors at Risk, 29, March 2002, A3 
4
 Economist, Corruption in Lesotho: Small place, big wave. 21 September 2002: 73 
5
 Webster, P. 2002. Ripped off in Russia, Maclean’s. www.mcleans.ca. 
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latter relationship has not got much attention in literature.  This paper aims to bridge that gap by 
addressing the question “Does the FDI from corrupt countries increase the level of corruption in 
host countries?”  The paper argues that the effects of FDI on corruption levels in the host 
countries depend on the investors’ economic and political conditions.  Most previous studies 
assume that investors are homogeneous and react similarly while investing abroad.  In this paper, 
I assume that investors are heterogeneous and react differently.  Foreign investors might bring in 
capital, entrepreneurship, and management skills to take advantages of investment opportunities 
in host countries.  Some of those investors, on the other hand, might bribe local officers in order 
to exploit the local resources and thus, increase the corruption levels in host countries.  
Using a panel of 189 countries over the period of 1995-2008, this paper tests the 
hypothesis that FDI from corrupt countries will increase the corruption levels in host countries.  
The regression results support the hypothesis and suggest the policy implication that developing 
countries should be aware of the impact from corrupt countries’ FDI.  Those FDI, on the one 
hand, contribute to economic development but on the other hand, might worsen the corruption 
level in host countries.  
2. Determinants of Corruption  
In recent years, researchers and policy makers have paid much attention to the influence of 
corruption on economic development.  Part of this effort focuses on the question why corruption 
exists and what makes it different among nations.  A number of studies in the literature have 
argued the connection between corruption and a large set of variables.  However, it is far from 
any consensus among researchers.  Variables’ coefficients that seem to be robust in one study 
become insignificant in other studies that employ different methods and different samples.  In 
this part, I will discuss the literature about the determinants of corruption.  
 Corruption here is defined as the misuse of public office for private gain (See Bardhan 
1997).  It is different from political corruption (e.g. vote buying in an election, legal or illegal 
contribution for a campaign by wealthy people for special interest groups etc.)  Corruption, as 
defined above, has existed in human society as long as the history of mankind itself.  Based upon 
the definition of corruption, it is not surprising that corruption is inherent in every governments 
ever founded. As Kaufmann (1997) quoted: 
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“[The King] shall protect trade routes from harassment by countries, state officials, 
thieves and frontier guards…[and] frontier officers shall make good what is lost…just as 
it is impossible not to taste money or poison that one may find at the tip of one’s tongue, 
so it is impossible for one dealing with government funds not to taste, at least a little bit, 
of the king’s wealth”.         
- From the Arthshasttra, by Kautilya (Chief Minister to 
the King in ancient India), circa 300 B.C – 150 A.D.  
Corruption can be considered as a kind of chronic disease that affects institutions. In a 
discussion on corruption, the World Bank claims that corruption is one the greatest obstacles to 
economic and social development.  It also says corruption “undermines development by 
distorting the role of law and weakening the institutional foundation on which economic growth 
depends.”
6
  Transparency International echoed that statement by saying corruption is one of the 
greatest challenges of the world, and corruption “undermines good government, fundamentally 
distorts public policy, leads to the misallocation of resources, harms the private sectors and 
private sector development and particularly hurts the poor.”
7
 
 According to Klitgaard (1998), corruption is an outcome of a weak administrative system 
that grants individual or organization monopoly power without proper discretion.  He also argues 
that corruption is likely to be greater in low income economies, so that the corruption in 
developing countries is more pervasive than in developed ones.  Researchers usually study two 
types of determinants of corruption: economic and non-economic factors.  Johnson, Kaufmann 
and Zoido-Lobaton (1998) argued that there is a positive relationship between corruption and the 
scope of government intervention, or the degree of control by the government in the economy.  
However, Treisman (2000) find a contradictory result and Lambsdorff (1999) find no evidence 
for such connection. He indicates that poor institutions are the main determinants of corruption.   
 Further investigation of the relationship between corruption and economic factors has 
provided more interesting evidence.  Gurgur and Shah (2005), Knack and Azfar (2005) show that 
trade openness or economic integration have a negative impact on corruption.   People in an open 
economy will benefit not only from international trade but also from exchange norms, 
information and ideas.  That means international trade will bring many positive effects to 







residents of a country.   Free trade is also a signal for a free life with less government control.  
Less government control, in turn, implies less opportunity for government officials to get 
involved with corruption.  Ades and Di Tella (1999) provide evidence that trade openness has 
negative relationship with corruption. Treisman (2000), Herzfeld and Weiss (2003) echo them 
and provide further evidence. Along with those arguments, researchers argue that restrictions on 
foreign trade, foreign investment and capital markets also magnify corruption.  Frechette (2001) 
provides evidence for this argument.  However, according to Tornell and Lane (1998), not all 
open economies have lower corruption levels.  They show that nations with high export share of 
natural resources and raw materials actually have more pervasive corruption.  
 Some studies have investigated the connection between income inequality and 
corruption.  As Paldam (2002) states, “A skew income distribution may increase the temptation 
to make illicit gains”.  Davoodi et al. (1998) indicates that there is a positive correlation between 
corruption and income inequality.  In her study of 37 countries, she uses Gini coefficient as a 
measurement for income inequality.  Li et al. (2000) add to Davoodi’s results the argument that 
the relationship between income distribution and corruption has a U-shape.  According to his 
argument, corruption might be high or low in a low-income country but it is high in a transitional 
economy.  However, Paldam (2002) shows that Gini coefficient is able to explain a little of 
variation in corruption.  Park (2003) and Brown et al. (2005) find an insignificant relation 
between income equality and corruption.  
 Among economic factors, one might argue that the economic development level has 
some impact on corruption.  In a developed country where officials receive high salaries the cost 
of losing that stable income might reduce their motivation for corruption, because government 
officials can live comfortably with their stable income and have less incentive to become corrupt.  
In other words, the marginal value of money from corruption is less in a developed country than 
in a developing one.  Government officials in developing countries live in worse conditions.  As 
a result, they have more temptation to engage in corruption.  Damania et al. (2004) and Persson 
et al. (2003) provide evidence for this argument.  They use the log of GDP per capita as a proxy 
for the development level.  Brown et al. (2005), Lederman et al (2005) also provide evidence 
that nation’s wealth has a negative relationship with corruption.  
 The non-economic determinants of corruption also attract attention from researchers.  
Major factors include democracy, religion, ethno-linguistic homogeneity and colonial origin.  
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The measures of democracy consist of a number of institutional variables that reflect how well 
the government protects individual freedom.  According to Laza Kekic (2007), the basic 
elements of democracy are: (a) whether elections are free and fair; (b) protection of minorities 
and respect for basic human rights; and (c) the representativeness of government.  Under this 
definition, democracy reflects institution quality and cultural elements in a society.  In a 
democratic society, one might argue that government chosen by public will use their power for 
the interest of the public.  If government uses its power to serve the public interest the likelihood 
of misuse power for private benefit (i.e. corruption) will decrease.  In addition, in a democratic 
society people have rights and tools to act as “watch dog” for government activities.  Given the 
high development of institutions in democratic society, corruption faces a negative condition for 
dispersion.  Therefore, democracy is supposed to have negative impact on corruption.  Lederman 
(2005) finds evidences for supporting this argument.  Kunicova and Rose_Ackerman (2005) 
provide further investigation with the same results.  
 Researchers also have investigated the impact of decentralization or federalism on 
corruption.  The results are still mixed.  Lederman et al. (2005) pioneered this idea.  In the study, 
he used transfers from central government to other local governments as a percentage of GDP as 
a proxy for decentralization.   He finds that decentralization reduces corruption significantly.  Ali 
and Isse (2003) echo that result in their study.  On the other hand, Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 
(2005) provide evidence that federalism increases corruption.  Likewise, using a dummy variable 
for the existence of a federal constitution, Treisman (2000) find that a federal structure might 
stimulate corruption. Goldsmith (1999) also provides similar evidences.  
Some studies have also looked at the connection between religion and corruption. The 
idea is that religion, as a cultural aspect, might have some influence on human behavior which, 
in turn, might affect corruption.  Herzfeld and Weiss (2003) and Chang and Golden (2004) find 
evidence for this type of connection.  They postulate that if number of people having affiliation 
with one particular religion increases the level of corruption might decrease.  Specifically, 
Treisman (2000) indicates that countries with many Protestants are likely to have lower 
corruption levels.  Paldam (2001) provides evidences that countries dominated by two religions 
(Protestant and Tribal) tend to have lower levels of corruption.  However, La Porta et al. (1999) 




 Some studies indicate that cultural factors including ethno-linguistic heterogeneity might 
matter in explaining corruption.  Lederman (2005) posits that ethno-linguistic homogeneity has 
negative impacts on corruption.  He argues that government officials might find more difficulty 
in extracting bribes from ethnic groups that he does not belong to.  If one ethnic group dominates 
the country others might have little access to power. Minorities with less political power may 
thus tend to collude with bureaucrats for better political position.  According to Ali and Isse 
(2003), in ethnic-diversified countries, an official behaves sequentially: first to his family, to his 
ethnic group, then to his country.  As a result, it is likely that highly fragmented communities 
will have higher corruption than homogenous one.  
 Another cultural factor that researchers have studied is colonial origin.  Colonial heritage 
might reflect the institutional quality in many countries.  Gurgur and Shah (2005) indicate that 
colonial masters might establish institutions in colonies after they conquer.  Then due to the 
persistence of institutions, colonial heritage might capture command and control habits and 
institution quality after the colonization process.  The evidence provided by the various studies 
is, however, mixed.  Gurgur and Shah (2005) show that corruption is more pervasive in countries 
that have been colonized.  Herzfeld and Weiss (2003) find evidence that former British colonies 
have lower levels of corruption than others. Persson et al. (2003) also finds the same results 
when comparing three groups of colonial origin, namely British, Spanish-Portuguese and other 
colonial origins.  
 The judicial system and bureaucracy quality are also important factors influencing 
corruption.  Some studies have investigated the connection between incomes in public sector and 
corruption.  Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) find that there is a positive correlation between 
public sector wage and the quality of the bureaucracy.  They argue that a high quality 
bureaucracy might be less corrupt, particularly in developing countries.  The reason is that 
developing countries lack effective institutions for detecting and controlling corruption.  That is 
why income might play a crucial role in fighting corruption.  Empirically, Herzeld and Weiss 
(2003) show that an increase in wages in the public sector significantly lessen corruption.  Rauch 
and Evans (2000) also indicate similar results.  However, other studies by Gurgur and Shah 
(2005), Treisman (2000) show that the relationship is not always robust. 
 Finally, the rule of law might be an explanatory factor for corruption.  Using the rule of 
law index of Kaufmann et al. (1991b), Damania et al. (2004) provide evidence that a strong rule 
60 
 
of law reduces corruption levels.  The Kaufmann index reflects the extent to which economic 
agents abide by the rules of society, the efficiency and predictability of the judiciary and the 
enforceability of contracts.  The International Country Risk Guide index also measure the rule of 
law in terms of sound political institutions, strong courts and enforcement of contracts.  Ali and 
Isse (2003), Herzfeld and Weiss (2003) use this type of index and find supporting evidence for 
Damania’s results.       
3. Data 
This section describes sources of data that I use in this study.  Since the paper investigates the 
impact of FDI from corrupt country on corruption levels in host countries I use number of 
control variables that have been tested in the literature.   
The dependent variable is corruption.  Measuring corruption is not easy since most 
corrupt dealings are secret.  Therefore, objective measures are rarely available.  So far, there is 
no consensus among researchers about what is the best index to use.  Most of the available data 
on corruption used by researchers are subjective.  Those are derived from questionnaire-based 
surveys.  This method captures public feelings about corruption in society, and therefore, 
measures the perception of corruption rather than corruption itself.  Interestingly, those 
subjective indexes are highly correlated (Tanzi, 1998).  I use three available datasets for 
corruption in this study.  The first set of data is Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from 
Transparency International (TI).  The TI index is scaled from 0 (most corrupt) to 9 (least 
corrupt).  Other sources of corruption indices come from World Bank Control of Corruption 
(CC) and International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  I use those sources for ancillary robustness 
checks on my primary results.  The index from the World Bank Control of Corruption (CC) 
measures corruption from 1 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt).  The International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) index goes from 1 (most corrupt) to 6 (least corrupt).  The corruption index is 
annual data.  For the convenience of the study, I rescale the data so that high figures refer to 
higher corruption. For example, the TI index used here equals ten minus the original TI index, 
and my ICRG index equals seven minus the original ICRG index.  
The main independent variable of interest is FDI from corrupt countries.  Since the paper 
aims to look at the effect of FDI from corrupt countries on host countries I somewhat arbitrarily 
set a threshold of 6 for dividing my sample.  The 106 countries with a corruption index (CPI) 
greater than 6 are categorized as corrupt.  The less corrupt sample consists of 83 countries.  I also 
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use corruption thresholds of 5 and 7 for sensitivity analysis.  The data for bilateral FDI come 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator 1995-2008.  FDI is measured annually in 
millions of dollars and adjusted for purchasing power parity.  There are 189 countries in the 
sample.  
The set of control variables used in the present study include the main determinants of 
corruption suggested in the literature.  Those control variables belong to two groups: economic 
and non-economic.  The most common economic control variable that researchers use in 
literature is development level.  Most studies have shown a negative relationship between 
development level and corruption.  To control for this variable, I use the log of GDP per capita as 
a proxy for the development level.  GDP per capita data is obtained from the World Development 
Indicators 1995-2008.  I also use GDP and total investment of home countries for robustness 
checks.  Data for GDP and total investment come from the World Development Indicators 1995-
2008 and Penn World Tables, respectively. 
As discussed above, trade openness or economic integration may also have a negative 
impact on corruption (Gurgur and Shah, 2005).  International trade will bring not only quality 
imported goods but also positive norms, information and ideas to residents of a country and low 
trade barriers also mean fewer opportunities for government officials to engage in corruption.  I 
use trade openness and natural resources as control variables.  Trade openness is calculated as 
percentage of imports and export in total GDP in a year.  I collect data for trade and natural 
resources from the World Development Indicators 1995-2008.  
In the literature, some studies have argued that income inequality might have significant 
impact on corruption.  I collect the Gini index as a measure of income inequality from the CIA 
Fact book from 1995 to 2008. The score of the Gini index ranges from 0 to 100, 0 indicating 
perfect economic equality and 100 perfect inequality.  For convenience of the study, I rescale the 
index so that 0 shows perfect inequality and 100 reflect perfect income equality.  
Among non-economic factors, I use democracy measured by an index from Freedom 
House, namely polright. The index captures the extent of basic political rights in a country.  
Polright index ranges from 0 (total freedom) to 100 (total repression).  For the convenience of 
the study, I rescale the index from 0 (total repression) to 100 (total freedom).  Freedom House 
provides data for 62 countries in the period of 1995-2008.  Among those, 41 countries are 
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corrupt which have a corruption index greater or equal to 6, and 21 countries belong to the less 
corrupt group.  
To control for religious effects, I use the percentage of the population belonging to the 
Protestant religion as a proxy for religion.  
Other non-economic factors include ethno-linguistic heterogeneity and colonial origin.  I 
collect data for ethno-linguistic from Alesina et al. (2003).  The index measures the degree of 
ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity in different countries.  The index ranges from 0 
(homogeneous) to 1 (strongly fractionalized).  Data for colonial origin come from La Porta et al 
(2003).  I use three colonial origin dummy variables (British, Socialist, and Other_Colonial). 
Dummy variable takes the value 1 if the country has been a colony of Great Britain (British), or 
other countries (Other_Colinial).  Dummy variable also takes the value of 1 if the country has 
declared itself socialist (Socialist) in its name or constitution.  The list of socialist countries is 
provided in table 4.12.    
4. Empirical Strategies 
This section discusses the empirical results.  My hypothesis is that an increase in FDI from 
corrupt countries stimulates corruption in host countries.  The general view in literature is that 
corruption in host countries has negative impact on FDI inflows.  However, the causal arrow 
may also point the opposite way, meaning that FDI inflows have some influence on corruption in 
host countries.  To overcome this issue, I create an instrumental variable (IV) for FDI and use 
two-stage least-square (2SLS) to estimate the impact of FDI on corruption.  The instrument 
needs to be highly correlated with the dependent variable for which it serves as an instrument 
and uncorrelated with the error term from the original model.  
Several studies in literature have used an IV for FDI.  Malesky (2005) uses predicted 
exchange rate as an instrument for FDI and finds a significant relationship between FDI and 
economic reform progress.  Another common trend used by researchers is to apply the gravity 
model in trade.  Larrain and Tavares (2004) use geographical distance to the largest countries in 
the world as an instrument for FDI inflows.  Jensen and Rosas (2007) in a study of the Mexican 
economy create an IV for FDI using distances from borders of home countries to Mexico.  Pinto 
and Zhu (2008) use bilateral geographic distance between the host countries and the top twenty 
economies and their real GDP per capita to create an instrumental variable for inbound FDI.  I 




          (1) 
  
where i,j = 1,2,3….N indicate the host and source countries, respectively and N is 189 for the 
sample.  is a vector of exogenous variables excluded from  the second stage regression;  is 
the estimated coefficient for the instrument.  In equation (1), we expect an inverse relationship 
between FDI and distance between home and host countries, and a positive relationship with 
home and host countries’ GDPs.  Because distance and home country’s GDP variables in 
equation (1) have no influence on corruption level in host country, we expect that the 
instrumental variable is positively correlated with FDI inflows and uncorrelated with the error 
term in the equation explaining corruption. 
Since the study investigates the impact of FDI from corrupt countries on host corruption I 
need an instrument FDI_Corrupt which represents FDI inflows from corrupt countries.  To do 
that, I run a second regression for equation (1) for only home countries which have corruption 
index greater or equal to 6.  
 
The second stage regression is as follows, 
Corruptionit = βo + β1 + β2 + β3 (  * Corruptionit-1)  
+ β4 Corruptionit-1 + β5 Corruptionit-2 + β6 Log (GDP_per_capitait)                (2) 
+ β7 Trade_Opennessit +β8 Natural_Resourcesit + β9 Income_Equalityit  
+ β10 Democracyit + β11 Ethno-Linguisticit + β12 Protestantit + β13 Britishi  
+ β14 Socialisti + β15 Other_Coloniali + εit,          
  
where Corruptionit is corruption level in  host country i at time t.    is the percentage 
of FDI from corrupt country in total FDI to host country i at time t.  To make it easier to interpret 
the results, I multiply  by 100 so that   range from 0 to 100.   
Corruptionit-1 and Corruptionit-2 are lags at time t-1 and t-2 of corruption level in country i.  
GDP_per_capitait is GDP per capita of country i at time t.  Trade_Opennessit is calculated as 
percentage of total imports and exports in GDP of country i at time t.  Natural_Resourcesit refers 
to the abundance of natural resources in country i at time t.  Income_Equalityit measures income 
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distribution in country i at time t. Democracyit reflects how democratic country i is at time t.  
Ethno-Linguisticit measures the fractionalization in language in country i at time t.  Protestantit  
captures the percentage of residents belonging to Protestant religion in total population.  Finally, 
I include three dummy variables for colonial origins (British, Socialist and Other_Colonial). 
Several studies argue that corruption is persistent (See Herzfeld and Weiss, 2003). 
Therefore, I include two lags of corruption in the regression to capture the effect of persistence.  
As most of the literature finds, I expect positive influences of natural resources and ethno-
linguistic fractionalization on corruption.  In addition, I expect GDP, trade openness, income 
equality, democracy, protestant and British colonial origin to have negative impacts on 
corruption.  The explanatory variables of primary interest, and  are 
predicted to have a positive influence on corruption.  
Table 4.1 summarizes all sources of data used in this study.  Table 4.2 presents some 
descriptive statistics for the main variables.  Table 4.3 shows a correlation matrix for those 
variables.  Table 4.4 presents the results for first-stage regression.  To test the validity of the 
instrument I use a Sargan test.  The null hypothesis is that the instrument is uncorrelated with the 
error term.  The p-value is 0.117.  The result shows that I failed to reject the null hypothesis at 
10%.  Table 4.5 reports the results of second stage regression for OLS, the 2 SLS regressions and 
one-way Fixed Effect model.  For the regressions, I use the corruption perception index (CPI) 
from Transparency International as dependent variable.  I use data for FDI inflows collected 
from World Development Indicators in OLS models.  The FDI_Corrupt variable in OLS 
regressions are the summation of all FDI from all countries with corruption index greater or 
equal to 6.  I report regressions results with the sample of 189 countries in model 1, 3, 5 and sub-
sample of 62 countries in model 2, 4.  Due to the size of sample, I use results in model 3 as my 
benchmark.  The results of model 3 in table 4.5 show that two lags of corruption, GDP, trade 
openness, Protestant, and British colonial origin significantly explain corruption levels with the 
expected signs.  Two lags of corruption coefficients are significant at the 5% level.  Other 
coefficients are significant at the 10% level.  However, natural resources, income equality, 
democracy and ethno-linguistic variables are not significant.   
As shown in model 3 of table 4.5, one of the two variables of prime interest, FDI from 
corrupt countries in total FDI at time t-1, has the expected sign and is significant at the 10% 
level.  However, FDI from corrupt countries in total FDI at time t has no significant effect on 
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corruption at time t.  This suggests that it takes time for foreign investors to influence the 
domestic bureaucracy.  In addition, the results indicate significant relationship between 
interaction of FDI from corrupt countries variable and corruption index.  This might indicate a 
nonlinearity relationship between FDI and corruption levels.  One explanation for this is that the 
impact of FDI from corrupt countries on host countries might depend on the host country’s 
condition.  If the host country is already corrupt an increase in FDI from other corrupt countries 
might magnify the host country corruption.  Firms from corrupt countries might utilize their 
experiences adapted domestically to win contracts in the new environment.  That gives them 
some degree of comparative advantage.  As a result, corruption becomes more pervasive in host 
countries.  On the other hand, if the host country is less corrupt then foreign firms have to follow 
the rules and norms set by sound institutions.  Moreover, in a less corrupt country markets tend 
to be more competitive with more investment opportunities.  By entering the markets, foreign 
firms might foster competition and increase the efficiency.  That would require other firms to 
reduce costs including exactions and bribes to stay competitive.  Experiences and knowledge 
from domestic corruption would not help firms from corrupt countries anymore.  Hence, we 
might not see bad effects of FDI from corrupt countries.  
According to the third column in table 4.5, an increase of 1 per cent in FDI from corrupt 
countries in total FDI from last year might result in an increase of 0.17 plus 0.016 times 
corruption level of last year in current corruption index for host countries.  For example, for a 
country like Bulgaria or Fiji, an increase of 1 per cent of FDI from corrupt countries in total FDI 
in 2005 might increase corruption level of 2006 by 0.266 point. (Both Bulgaria and Fiji had a 
corruption index of 6 in 2005.)  
Model 4 and 5 in table 4.5 show the robustness of the primary results in model 3.  The 
main coefficients keep the same sign and significance.  According to model 4, the marginal 
effect of a 1 per cent increase in FDI from corrupt countries in total FDI on host country current 
corruption index is estimated to be (0.11 + 0.014 x last year’s corruption index). Model 5 gives 








5. Robustness Checks 
5.1 Alternative ways to measure relative impact of FDI on the economy 
To check the robustness of my findings, I use GDP and total investment of host countries 
to measure the effect of FDI from corrupt countries to the host economies. Because FDI is 
considered as investment into production and has positive relationship with GDP and total 
investment, GDP and total investment may be good alternative indicators to measure effect of 
FDI on host economies.  GDP and total investment of the host country replaces the total FDI in 
the    variable.  The explanatory variable used for the robustness check regression is  
  and . To make it easier to interpret the results, I multiply 
 and 
 
by 100 so that  and  range from 0 
to 100.  A higher ratio indicates increasing impact of FDI from corrupt countries to host 
economy.  In economic sense, these variables do not change my main argument in this paper.  
Table 4.6 and 4.7 present the results for new explanatory variables.  The results in model 3, 4 and 
5 of table 4.6 and 4.7 are consistent with the hypothesis and earlier findings. 
According to the third column in table 4.6, an increase of 1 per cent of FDI from corrupt 
countries in total GDP from last year might result in an increase of 0.15 plus 0.019 times 
corruption level of last year in current corruption index for host countries.  For example, for 
Colombia, an increase of 1 per cent of FDI from corrupt countries in total FDI in 2005 might 
increase corruption level of 2006 by 0.264 point. (Colombia had a corruption index of 6 in 
2005.)  
Results in the third column of table 4.7 indicate that an increase of 1 per cent in FDI from 
corrupt countries in total investment from last year might result in an increase of 0.22 plus 0.025 
times corruption level of last year in current corruption index for host countries.  For example, 
for Colombia, an increase of 1 per cent of FDI from corrupt countries in total FDI in 2005 might 
increase corruption level of 2006 by 0.37 point. (Colombia had a corruption index of 6 in 2005.)  
5.2 Sensitivity analysis with different corruption thresholds 
To further check the robustness of the results, I use different cutoffs for corruption threshold.  In 
my benchmark results, the corruption threshold is 6. I carry sensitivity analysis with 2 other 
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corruption levels of 5 and 7.  The results are shown in table 4.8 and 4.9.  The results in model 3, 
4 and 5 in table 4.8 and 4.9 indicate the robustness of earlier findings.  
According to the third column in table 4.8, an increase of 1 per cent in FDI from corrupt 
countries in total FDI from last year might result in an increase of 0.23 plus 0.021 times 
corruption level of last year in current corruption index for host countries.  For example, for 
Colombia, an increase of 1 per cent of FDI from corrupt countries in total FDI in 2005 might 
increase corruption level of 2006 by 0.356 point. (Colombia had a corruption index of 6 in 
2005.)  The results reported in table 4.9 give the answer of 0.216 with the same scenario.  
5.3 Alternative indicators to measure corruption 
Finally, I use two alternative measures for dependent variable for robustness checks.  Those 
come from ICRG and World Bank Control of Corruption, respectively.  Although data from 
those two sources are coded differently and come from different surveys they are highly 
correlated (See Wei, 2000).  Table 4.10 and 4.11 present the results with data from ICRG and 
World Bank Control of Corruption.  The results are consistent with the hypothesis and earlier 
findings. 
According to the model 3 in table 4.11, an increase of 1 per cent in FDI from corrupt 
countries in total FDI from last year might result in an increase of 0.18 plus 0.012 times 
corruption level of last year in current corruption index for host countries.  For example, for 
Colombia, an increase of 1 per cent of FDI from corrupt countries in total FDI in 2005 might 
increase corruption level of 2006 by 0.252 point.  (Colombia had a corruption index at 6 in 
2005.) If we use reported results in table 4.11 the answer will be 0.176. 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, I empirically investigate the effects of FDI from corrupt countries on corruption in 
host countries.  I consider the economic as well as non-economic determinants of corruption.  
Using an instrumental variable for FDI and 2SLS setting, I find a positive relationship between 
FDI from corrupt countries and corruption in receiving economies.  However, the results indicate 
that it takes time for foreign investors to influence local corruption levels. In addition, the 
relationship might be nonlinear.  The findings suggest that the impacts of FDI are conditional on 
the underlying political and institutional environment in host countries.  With the increase of FDI 
from corrupt countries, corruption might be worse in corrupt countries relatively to less corrupt 
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ones. One explanation for this finding is that existing sound institutions and well-established rule 
of law in less corrupt countries may control the negative impacts brought by foreign firms.  In 
less corrupt countries; the firms from corrupt countries have less ability or incentive to use their 
experience in bribing government officials to create comparative advantage.  In corrupt countries 
on the other hand, they have more opportunities to enhance their trade position by exploiting and 
thereby enhancing the lack of sound institutions and rule of law in those countries.  
This study also has policy implications, suggesting that governments of developing 
countries should be aware of the possible negative impacts of accepting FDI from countries with 
poor institutions.  The argument that FDI increases competition and reduces corruption does not 
necessarily hold.  FDI from corrupt countries might worsen the business climate in host countries 
which have already been corrupt.  As shown in the previous chapter, there is evidence that firms 
from corrupt countries have incentives to invest more in a similarly corrupt economy.  By 
bribing local officials, foreign firms pay for their comparative advantage and make profit in 
unethical and illegal ways.  Although there is no evidence showing that firms from less corrupt 
countries do not engage in bribing local officials, my findings in this study indicate that more 
FDI from corrupt economies might increase corruption level in host countries.  Higher corruption 
levels, in turn, might push away potential firms from less corrupt countries.  Such foreign firms 
might find a better location for their operation and might not want to pay for all the risks 
involved with unfair competition and uncertainty.  That will leave host countries with no choice 
other than firms from corrupt economies. The increase in number of firms from corrupt 
background might, again, aggravate corruption in host countries. The loop might last forever. It 




Table 4.1: Variables and Sources 
Variable Sources 
FDI World Development Indicator  
Corruption Transparency International, Control of 
Corruption and ICRG.  
GDP World Development Indicator 
Trade_Openness World Development Indicator 
Democracy Freedom House 
Natural_Resources  
Colonial Origin 
World Development Indicator 
La Porta  
Religion CIA Fact book 
Ethno-linguistic Alesina  
Income Inequality CIA Fact book 
 
Table 4.2: Correlation Matrix of total dataset 








FDI 1 0.335 0.121 0.177     0.137 0.041  -0.022 -0.186 
GDP  1 0.361 -0.132 -0.152 -0.033 0.041 0.034 
Democracy   1  0.057 -0.059 0.228  0.043  0.077 
Trade_ Openness    1 0.026 0.033 -0.128  0.042 
Natural_   
Resources 
    1 0.015  0.075  0.038 
Religion      1 0.035 0.072 
Income 
Inequality 
      1 0.021 




Table 4.3: Overall Summary Statistics 
 
 Observations Mean S.D Minimum Maximum 
FDI 2,646 12,080.34 3,617.4 -2,835.2 32,315.66 
GDP 2,646 6512.3 4385.61 82.01 14369.1 
Corruption 2,646 3.905 1.2278 0 9 
Democracy 2,646 0.32 0.22 0 1 
Trade_Openness 2,646 0.68 0.29 0.11 3.29 
Natural_Resources 2,646 0.63 0.57 0.15 0.77 
Religion 2,646 0.53 0.34 0.02 0.97 
Income Inequality 2,646 68 46 28 91 




Table 4.4: First-Stage Regression Results 
(Dependent Variable: FDI) 







































*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1                  Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. 
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Table 4.5: Second-stage Regression Results 
(Dependent Variable: Corruption Index from TI, Corruption Threshold = 6) 




























































































Income Equality -0.03 -0.09 -0.15 -0.11 -0.25 
 (0.11) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.32) 
Democracy 
 

























Colonial Origin      























N 2,268 744 2,268 744 2,268 
R2 0.627 0.684 0.651 0.708 0.748 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1                 Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. 
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Table 4.6: Robustness Checks with Host Country’s GDP  
(Dependent Variable: Corruption Index from TI, Corruption Threshold = 6) 




























































































Income Equality -0.11 -0.14 -0.18 -0.12 -0.21 
 (0.12) (0.15) (0.21) (0.14) (0.22) 
Democracy 
 

























Colonial Origin      























N 2,268 744 2,268 744 2,268 
R2 0.631 0.668 0.638 0.672 0.736 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1                 Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
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Table 4.7: Robustness Checks with Host Country’s Total Investment 
(Dependent Variable: Corruption Index from TI, Corruption Threshold = 6) 































(FDI corruptit-1/ Total Investmentit-1)* 
Corruptionit-1 





























































Income Equality -0.11 -0.19 -0.28 -0.22 -0.31 
 (0.12) (0.21) (0.31) (0.24) (0.32) 
Democracy 
 

























Colonial Origin      























N 2,268 744 2,268 744 2,268 
R2 0.642 0.669 0.646 0.674 0.733 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1                    Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
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Table 4.8: Robustness Checks  
(Dependent Variable: Corruption Index from TI, Corruption Threshold = 5) 




























































































Income Equality -0.08 -0.17 -0.12 -0.18 -0.21 
 (0.15) (0.21) (0.16) (0.22) (0.25) 
Democracy 
 

























Colonial Origin      























N 2,268 744 2,268 744 2,268 
R2 0.615 0.678 0.622 0.684 0.752 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1             Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
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Table 4.9: Robustness Checks 
(Dependent Variable: Corruption Index from TI, Corruption Threshold = 7) 




























































































Income Equality -0.05 -0.11 -0.18 -0.15 -0.09 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.22) (0.16) (0.12) 
Democracy 
 

























Colonial Origin      























N 2,268 744 2,268 744 2,268 
R2 0.641 0.678 0.644 0.685 0.743 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1                    Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
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Table 4.10: Robustness Checks - Corruption Threshold = 6 
(Dependent Variable: Corruption Index from ICRG) 




























































































Income Equality -0.11 -0.16 -0.25 -0.14 -0.21 
 (0.21) (0.26) (0.28) (0.17) (0.32) 
Democracy 
 

























Colonial Origin      























N 2,268 744 2,268 744 2,268 
R2 0.612 0.657 0.628 0.661 0.715 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1                   Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
78 
 
Table 4.11: Robustness Checks - Corruption Threshold = 6 
(Dependent Variable: Corruption Index from World Bank Control of Corruption)  




























































































Income Equality -0.25 -0.15 -0.17 -0.12 -0.21 
 (0.31) (0.16) (0.18) (0.14) (0.22) 
Democracy 
 

























Colonial Origin      























N 2,268 744 2,268 744 2,268 
R2 0.633 0.665 0.642 0.681 0.724 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1                  Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. 
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Table 4.12: List of Socialist Countries 
Afghanistan Georgia 
Albania Hungary 
Angola Laos  
Azerbaijan Moldova  
Algeria Mongolia  
Belarus North Korea  





Cuba Somalia  
Czech Republic  Ukraine 










My dissertation investigates the role of institution quality in financial markets and foreign direct 
investment (FDI).  The empirical findings of my study indicate that institution quality plays a 
crucial role in financial markets and FDI.  
 Specifically, the first essay paper explores the impact of press freedom on stock earnings 
in emerging markets.  The media are considered as a crucial institution in the financial market.  
Enhancement of press freedom implies better quality information provided to investors as well as 
better government and business accountability.  Free media might also create good foundation 
for economic growth and reduce the systematic risk faced by investors in the economy.  
Investors therefore may require lower expected excess returns on financial assets for the lower 
risk they face.  The results suggest that press freedom have a negative relationship with excess 
returns of financial assets.  Firms in countries with less press freedom have higher excess returns 
which is consistent with the fact that those firms bring higher risk to investors.     
My two other essays study a different angle of institutional quality: corruption. The third 
chapter of this dissertation investigates the relationship between corruption heterogeneity 
between two countries and bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) between the two.  The FDI 
has provided immensely positive effect to receiving countries’ economies.  Cross-border flows 
of direct investment have grown remarkably in the past twenty years.  According to Held et al. 
(1999), total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has grown at a faster speed than the income of the 
world since 1960s, and multinational corporations (MNCs) contribute more than 70 percent to 
world trade.  FDI contributes to growth in host countries by bringing in new technology, 
management skills, capital etc. that cannot be achieved by trade in goods and services or 
financial investment.  FDI therefore has become increasingly important to host countries, 
especially developing ones, for sustainable long-run economic growth. 
It is important to understand the effect of corruption on FDI since corruption might 
create uncertainty in economic policy as well as unethical business practice and increase cost of 
doing business.  There is empirical evidence showing the negative impacts of corruption on 
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domestic investment and economic growth.  However, the evidence of corruption on FDI is still 
ambiguous.  In this study, I argue that investors from corrupt countries might have tendency to 
invest in other corrupt countries.  The reason is that they may learn from their experience and 
adapt easily in another corrupt country.  As a result, they may be more successful than investors 
from less corrupt economies in bribing local officers and surviving in new environment.  The 
results reveal that FDI inflow is negatively correlated with corruption, yet FDI is positively 
correlated with homogeneity in corruption levels between two countries.  
The fourth chapter of my dissertation investigates further the relationship between FDI 
and corruption.  The central argument of this chapter is that FDI from corrupt countries might 
magnify the corruption levels in host countries.  The results show that there is significant 
relationship between corruption and FDI from corrupt countries.  However, it takes time for 
foreign investors to influence local corruption levels.  In addition, the relationship might be 
nonlinear.  Evidence provided in my last two chapters suggests a loop of FDI and corruption that 
developing countries might get trapped in unless they make enough effort to improve the quality 
of existing institutions.  The loop is that corrupt countries might receive more direct investment 
from foreign firms who originate in similarly corrupt conditions.  Foreign firms from corrupt 
countries, in turn, have potential to deteriorate underlying poor institutions in host countries by 
bribing local officials.  As a result, local government officials in developing countries might have 
incentives to be associated with more bribery and less intention for any ameliorative actions.  
They might even use illegal money from bribery to buy more powerful positions in bureaucracy 
and fight against any anti-corruption attempts.  Worse corruption level might turn away potential 
clean firms.  The increase in number of firms from corrupt background might, again, aggravate 
corruption in host countries.  The process may keep going on and on. 
In sum, this dissertation provides three contributions to existing literature on institutions. 
Contributions include empirical findings on the impact of press freedom in financial markets, the 
relationship between inflow FDI and corruption.  The results also suggest policy implications to 
improve economic growth by enhancing press freedom and fighting corruption. Fighting 
corruption effectively and improving the quality of institutions has been a challenging task for 
most of developing countries in the world.  The solutions for better institutions and corruption 
fight might vary from country to country and over time.  However, I believe that governments in 
developing countries should be the key elements for this process.  They are the reasons and also 
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the solutions for the problems.  To improve the quality of institutions, governments in “third 
world” countries should implement several policies. First, it should set a goal of becoming a 
good government. A good government is expected to be chosen through democratic elections, 
accountable through transparency and the provision of information, effective means of 
combating corruption. A good government also has goals to improve human rights through 
freedom of religion and speech, create and maintain effective justice systems and avoid abusing 
arbitrary government power.  According to Serageldin and Landell-Mills (1991), a good 
government is a crucial condition for good governance which plays a key role in moving society 
forward, improving institutional and economic development.   Good government, therefore, 
would be the most important factor for fighting corruption and enhancing existing institutions. 
For example, besides establishing an independent judiciary, governments in developing countries 
should explore the efficacy of creating independent agencies to fight corruption.  To be effective, 
such agencies should be insulated from corrupt influence.  The agent should be designed to have 
ability to investigate any public or private entities that have engaged in corruption.  Finally, 
education and mass media also play very important roles in this process.  Raising public’s 
awareness through education and mass media might help to prevent corruption and improve 
institutions.   
From the international perspective, international organizations such as World Bank 
(WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization (WTO) can help 
developing countries generate both the will to improve institutions and the capability to do so. 
Despite the difficulty of the process, international organizations have been contributing to the 
success by providing aid to support democratic reforms, improved governance and more 
competitive economies.   However, developing countries with poor institutions need a more 
focused effort from those international organizations.  For example, World Bank or IMF might 
help to form a regional effort to fight corruption.  Countries in a same region such as South East 
Asia, South Asia, Latin America, Africa etc. might share some common features and the 
successful stories in anti-corruption and institution improvement process of a country might be 
easily applied to its neighbors. Additionally, international organizations might provide 
developing countries with analytical frameworks and more resources for diagnosing and dealing 
with corruption.  
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Developed countries with good institutions in place might also provide good help to 
developing countries.  The help may come in forms of financial aids, knowledge or experience. 
However, all the assistance from developed countries should be based on the underlying 
institutions in developing countries.  Policies that do not take into account the underlying 
institutional conditions in developing countries might be counterproductive.  For example, one 
possible effect of anti-corruption laws that forbid bribes by U.S. firms is that U.S. firms might 
move away from corrupt countries to less corrupt ones.  That might leave corrupt countries with 
even fewer choices.  They might have to choose firms from corrupt countries even if they do not 
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